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I. INTRODUCTION
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liber-
ate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, "You are free
to compete with all the others," and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair. Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity.
All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates.1
The United State Supreme Court's recent review of affirmative ac-
tion admissions policies in Grutter v. Bollinger2 and Gratz v. Bollin-
ger3 confirms that the Court applies a different strict scrutiny test for
challenges to affirmative action programs aimed at improving diver-
sity in the classroom than the test it applies to challenges to programs
aimed at achieving racial equality in the workplace. Since the first
challenge to an affirmative action program over twenty-five years ago,
the Court has required that a race-conscious program not be upheld
under the Constitution unless it passes the strict scrutiny test.4 Jus-
tice Powell first articulated the strict scrutiny test in Regents of the
University of California at Davis v. Bakke,5 writing that a race-con-
scious program survives strict scrutiny if it is "precisely tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest."6 Post-Bakke challenges
more clearly defined the test, requiring state or federal entities de-
fending any race-conscious program to demonstrate that there was a
compelling governmental interest in the program, and to establish
that the program was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.7
The Bakke case considered whether the affirmative action admis-
sions program at the University of California at Davis violated the
Equal Protection Clause by granting preferential treatment in its ad-
missions decisions to applicants of color.8 Justice Powell, writing for a
plurality of the Court, identified a compelling governmental interest
in achieving diversity in the classroom, but found-along with four of
his brethren-that the Davis program was not narrowly tailored to
1. President Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Speech at Howard Univer-
sity (June 4, 1965), reprinted in Joseph A. Califano Jr., Letter to the Editor,
L.B.J. on Race Equality, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003, at A22. The writer was spe-
cial assistant to President Johnson from 1965 to 1969.
2. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
4. See infra section II.A.
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. Id. at 299.
7. See infra Part 1I.
8. 438 U.S. at 269-70.
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meet that objective. 9 Following Bakke, the Court heard a series of af-
firmative action challenges, all of which considered the constitutional-
ity of affirmative action programs aimed at providing greater racial
equality in the workplace.lO Through these cases, the Court identified
a compelling governmental interest in remedying past effects of pre-
sent discrimination, and more formally promulgated the narrowly tai-
lored test to allow for ease of evaluation of these programs."
The post-Bakke challenges implicitly suggested the Court's willing-
ness to treat programs aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom
differently from those designed to enhance equality in the work-
place.12 The Court's failure to put its imprimatur on Justice Powell's
decision, however, had unfortunate results. Because the Court never
used the workplace challenges as an opportunity to endorse Justice
Powell's plurality decision in Bakke, a split developed in the circuits
concerning whether Justice Powell's definition of a compelling govern-
mental interest in achieving diversity in the classroom was binding on
lower courts.
13
The Grutter and Gratz decisions, which presented the Court with
the first post-Bakke challenge to affirmative action programs aimed at
achieving diversity in the classroom, offered the Court an opportunity
to endorse Justice Powell's decision.14 In reviewing challenges to two
affirmative action admissions policies, the Court confirmed that there
is a compelling governmental interest in achieving diversity in the
classroom. 15 Equally important, while reviewing the challenged pro-
grams, the Court articulated a "narrowly tailored" test that is argua-
bly more appropriate for evaluating challenges to affirmative action
programs aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom than those de-
signed to increase racial equality in the workplace.
16
This Article will identify the new strict scrutiny test, and will con-
sider the reason for creating a separate definition of strict scrutiny for
evaluating affirmative action policies that achieve diversity in the
classroom. Part II of the Article will review constitutional challenges
9. Id. at 307-10.
10. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149 (1987); see also, Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative Action Admis-
sions Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First
Century, 22 J.C. & U.L. 895 (1996).
11. See infra subsection II.A.2.
12. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S. 469; Paradise, 480 U.S. 149;
see also Garfield, supra note 10.
13. Compare Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 118 (9th Cir. 2000), with
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
14. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
15. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268.
16. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-32; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 267-72.
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to affirmative action policies prior to Grutter and Gratz, and will dis-
cuss the split in the circuits that resulted from the Court's failure to
endorse Justice Powell's definition of a compelling governmental in-
terest in Bakke. Part III will provide an analysis of the Grutter and
Gratz decisions, with a particular focus on each Court's discussion of
the strict scrutiny test. Part IV will define the Court's strict scrutiny
test for evaluating affirmative action admission policies, and will
highlight why it is appropriate to use separate tests for challenges to
affirmative action programs aimed at achieving diversity in the work-
place and those aimed at achieving diversity in education.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHALLENGES TO AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS AND POLICIES
A. The Supreme Court's Application of the Strict
Scrutiny Test
1. Challenges to Affirmative Action Admissions Policies
Because race-conscious affirmative action policies potentially grant
preferential treatment to one class of people, opponents began chal-
lenging the policies,, arguing that the policies violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.17 The Supreme Court first considered an affirmative
action program in Regents of the University of California at Davis v.
Bakke. 18 Allen Bakke, a white male, unsuccessfully applied for ad-
mission to the University of California at Davis Medical School ("Da-
17. See supra note 10.
18. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Equal Protection Challenges to postsecondary school admissions policies have
shaped the form that such policies take. Schools initially adopted race-conscious
admissions policies in response to the civil rights movement and the practical
realities of admitting minority students under the objective-based criteria upon
which colleges and universities relied. See Leslie Yalof Garfield & Kelly Levi,
Finding Success in the Cauldron of Competition: The Effectiveness of Academic
Support Programs, 2004 BYU J. PUB. L. 1. As a practical and time-saving mat-
ter, most admissions committees based acceptance to their institution on a stu-
dent's objective standardized test score and his or her grade point average. See
id. The large volume of applications to higher education institutions necessitated
the need to create automatic admit and automatic rejection categories, which
were defined in terms of a score that was based on an applicant's score on stan-
dardized tests and/or an applicant's grade point average from his or her prior
academic institution. See id.
Unfortunately, as major studies conclude, underrepresented minority groups
do not perform as well on standardized tests as do members of the majority. See
id. Consequently, admissions to schools that heavily weighted standardized tests
in their admissions process rarely admitted students of color. In order to admit a
diverse class, schools were faced with three options: (1) disregard the standard-
ized tests entirely, (2) lower the floor for an acceptable score on the standardized
test, or (3) create what came to be called race-conscious admissions policies as a
means to admit students who would not have been admitted under the strict ob-
jective standards. See id. Under option three, race would be considered a "plus"
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vis") in 1973 and 1974.19 He challenged the school's 1973 admission
policy, adopted in an effort to diversify its entering class, on the
grounds that it operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of
his race. Bakke challenged the policy as violating the Equal Protec-
tion Clause,20 the California Constitution,2 1 and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI").22
that admissions committees would add to the student's objective test scores. See
id.
At the time, option one seemed entirely impractical. Admissions committees
had neither the time nor the resources to review every application that was sub-
mitted. Moreover, the standardized test score, although criticized, provided, and
still provides, a reasonable threshold for review of applications, therefore making
the application review process slightly more manageable. See id. Option two was
quickly disregarded, because, in the minds of academicians, lowering the floor of
the acceptable test score would decrease the mean score of the class. To those
who maintain that these test scores are objective, the scores reflect one's aca-
demic ability and intellectual prowess; a lower mean would result in top schools
diminishing the "eliteness" of their entering classes.
Thus, schools were left with option three, and, beginning in the mid-1970s,
schools began to devise their own race-conscious admissions programs as a
means to admit more underrepresented minority applicants. See id. These pro-
grams followed Justice Powell's edict in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, that postsecondary school and graduate school admissions programs could
consider race as a factor in their admissions processes. Consequently, schools
began admitting students whose admissions files suggested that they were likely
to become successful in their professional life, whose objective criteria, such as
SAT, LSAT, or GMAT and grade point average, were not competitive with the
majority of the entering class. See id. These affirmative action admissions poli-
cies, also considered race-conscious admissions programs, provided another vehi-
cle for enhancing minority representation in the classroom. See id.
19. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-77. In 1973, Mr. Bakke received a benchmark score of
468/500, but his application was late, and after his application was completed, no
applicants in the general admission pool were admitted with a score below 470/
500. Id. at 276. At that time, four seats in the special admission program were
open, although Mr. Bakke was not considered for these seats. Id. Mr. Bakke
wrote to the Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions Committee Dr.
George H. Lowrey to protest the admissions quotas. Id. In 1974, Mr. Bakke ap-
plied early and received high marks from a student interviewer, but received low
marks from the faculty interviewer who, coincidentally, was Dr. Lowrey. Id. at
277. Dr. Lowery gave him his lowest score of 86, making his total score 549/600
(there was one additional interviewer in 1974, so the total score was 600, as op-
posed to 500 in 1973). Id. Under the special admission program, applicants were
admitted with significantly lower credentials than Mr. Bakke. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.").
21. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges
or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens. Privileges or immu-
nities granted by the Legislature may be altered or revoked.").
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) ("No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
2005] 635
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At the time, Davis employed a bifurcated admissions policy. One
committee considered nonminority applicants who had achieved a
minimum 2.5 undergraduate GPA ("UGPA").23 Another committee
considered all minority candidates, regardless of their objective
scores.2 4 The school set aside a certain number of seats for applicants
in each of the groups. 2 5 Individuals from the general applicant pool
could not fill seats from the minority applicant pool, even if seats were
available. 26 Bakke claimed that the policy, which allowed the school
to set aside a certain number of places for minority applicants with
lower objective test scores than his own, was tantamount to a quota.
2 7
The trial court found that Davis's admission policy was a racial quota
and held that it violated the California and United States Constitu-
tions, as well as Title VI.28 The California Supreme Court affirmed
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
23. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
24. Id. at 274-75. Each applicant in the nonminority group was evaluated on the
basis of his or her UGPA, MCAT score, and observations made during a personal
interview conducted by a member of the Admissions Committee. The Committee
automatically rejected nonminority applicants whose UGPA fell below 2.5. Id. at
273. In contrast, the committee referred minority student applications to a Spe-
cial Admissions Committee comprised mainly of members of minority groups.
This Committee rated minority applicants in a manner similar to the applicants
in the general applicant pool, except that a 2.5 UGPA did not serve as a ground
for summary rejection. Id. at 275. Thus, all minority applicants were considered
for admission by the Special Admissions Committee, regardless of their UGPA.
Id.
With the exception of the minimum UGPA for nonminorities, students were
evaluated for admissions based on the same general criteria. However, each of
the two Admissions Committees operated in a vacuum and did not compare its
applicants to the other applicant group. The Special Admissions Committee did
not rate or compare minority applicants to the nonminority applicants, but could
accept or reject applicants based on failure to meet course requirements or other
specific deficiencies. The Special Admissions Committee continued to recom-
mend applicants until the number set by faculty vote were admitted. Id. at
273-75.
25. Id. at 275. In 1968, when the overall class size was fifty, the faculty set aside
eight seats for minorities. In 1971, the overall class size was expanded to 100,
and in 1973, the number of seats set aside for minorities was expanded to sixteen.
Id.
26. Id. at 272-76.
27. Id. at 277-78. When Davis rejected Bakke in 1973, four seats reserved for appli-
cants from the minority pool were unfilled, while the seats for the general admis-
sion pool were filled. Id. at 276. Following the second rejection, Allen Bakke
sued Davis and the Regents of the University of California in state court. See
generally Garfield, supra note 10.
28. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 278-79. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court emphasized
that minority applicants in the program were rated only against one-another and
that sixteen places out of the class of 100 were reserved exclusively for minorities.
Id. at 279.
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this.2 9 Upon the State's appeal, the Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari.
30
The Supreme Court, considering both the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VI, affirmed the California Supreme Court's decision. 3 1 The
Court subjected the Davis program to the most exacting evaluation.
According to the majority, "[tihe Constitution guarantees" that when a
program touches upon "an individual's race or ethnic background, he
is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to
bear ... is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est."32 This language became the embodiment of the strict scrutiny
test.
The Court, in a highly fractionalized opinion, struck down the Da-
vis policy. Justice Powell was chosen to write the majority opinion. 3 3
He concluded that the Davis program violated both Title VI and the
Equal Protection Clause.34 Applying the strict scrutiny test,35 Justice
Powell found that there was a compelling governmental interest in
attaining a diverse student body.36 A diverse student body contribut-
ing to a robust exchange of ideas is a constitutionally permissible goal
on which a race-conscious university admissions program may be
29. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976). The California
Supreme Court ordered Davis to admit Mr. Bakke to the Medical School, since
the school was unable to demonstrate that the plaintiff would not have been ad-
mitted in the absence of the challenged program. Id. at 1172. Applying strict
scrutiny, it concluded that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause it was not the least intrusive means of achieving the school's compelling
goals. Id. at 1167.
30. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281.
31. Id. at 320. A majority of the Supreme Court agreed that Davis must admit
Bakke. At the Supreme Court level, Davis maintained that there was no private
right of action under Title VI. Id. at 283-84. However, although the Court
reached its decision based on the Equal Protection argument, it still recognized
that a private right of action might exist under Title VI. Id. Because the issue
was not argued or decided below, the Court chose not to address "this difficult
issue." Id. at 283. The Court also did not address the issue of whether private
plaintiffs under Title VI must exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing
legal action. Id. at 283-84.
32. Id. at 299 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
33. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269.
34. Id. at 270-71.
35. Id. at 299. Justice Powell also wrote that "in order to justify the use of a suspect
classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitution-
ally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'neces-
sary ... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."
Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)); see also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964).
36. Attainment of a diverse student body is related to academic freedom. Bakke, 438
U.S. at 311-12.
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predicated.3 7 However, while the Constitution does not bar admission
policies from introducing race as a factor in the selection process, Jus-
tice Powell concluded that the program was not narrowly tailored and
that preferring members of any one group for no reason other than
race or ethnic origin is discrimination on its own. 38 The Davis admis-
sions policy, which set aside a specific number of seats for students in
identified minority groups, unfairly benefited the interest of a victim-
ized group at the expense of other innocent individuals and, therefore,
violated the Equal Protection Clause.3 9 Additionally, its practice of
having separate admissions subcommittees review minority and
nonminority candidates inappropriately insulated applicants from
comparison against the entire admissions pool.40 For these reasons,
Justice Powell concluded that the Davis admissions policy was consti-
tutionally impermissible.
Justice Powell's opinion acknowledged that the majority viewed
the Davis admissions policy as seeking to achieve a goal that is of par-
amount importance to the fulfillment of its mission and, in fact, as
serving an important governmental interest.4 1 Justice Powell's opin-
ion endorsed the policy of considering race as a "plus" in instances
37. Id. Justice Powell noted that educational excellence is widely believed to be pro-
moted by a diverse student body. Id. at 313-14.
38. Id. at 307. ("We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived
as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent indi-
viduals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of consti-
tutional or statutory violations."). Id.
Title VI clearly establishes that where there is a need to overcome the effects
of past racially discriminatory or exclusionary practices engaged in by federally
funded institutions, race-conscious action is required to accomplish the remedial
objectives of Title VI. Id. at 307-09. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun agreed with this, stating that "[Title VI] does not bar the preferential
treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimina-
tion to the extent that such action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 328.
39. Id. at 307. Justice Powell upheld the California Supreme Court's decision that
the special admissions program was unlawful, and that Mr. Bakke was to be ad-
mitted to Medical School; however, it reversed the decision enjoining the Medical
School from considering race in admissions. Id. at 320-25. Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed
that the policy was unlawful because it unfairly favored one group over another.
Id. at 325. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the
holding and dissented in part, as they did not believe that Allen Bakke should be
admitted to the Medical School or that quotas should be maintained. Id. at 379.
They joined in parts I and V-C, and White joined in part II-A. Id. at 328. Along
with Justice Powell, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun upheld
the use of race in the admissions process, while Justices Burger, Stevens, Rehn-
quist, and Stewart considered the issue irrelevant to this case. See RON SIM-
MONS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION AFTER
BAKxE 1-2 (1982).
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
41. Id.
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where an affirmative action admissions policy is free from clear goals
or quotas. 42 Indeed, a majority of the Bakke Court recognized the
University's right to select students who would best contribute to the
"'robust exchange of ideas."' 43 Ethnic diversity, however, is only one
element in a range of factors a university may properly consider in
attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.44
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehn-
quist joined in Justice Powell's conclusion that the program was inva-
lid based on the conclusion that the program violated Title VI, and
thus there was no need to evaluate the program under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.45 While not agreeing outright with Justice Powell's
compelling "governmental interest" definition, the plurality's acknowl-
edgement of a university's right to achieve a heterogeneous student
body suggests a tacit agreement. 46 Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun were in the minority of the Justices' lead opinion,
concluding that Title VI permits federally-funded entities to enact pro-
grams or policies that assist minority groups to gain equal access to
programs more easily available to Caucasians. 47 However, Title VI
and the Civil Rights Act do not take precedence over the constitutional
protection of the Equal Rights Clause, and thus such programs or poli-
cies are valid only to the extent that they are coterminous with the
Fourteenth Amendment. 48 Thus, because four Justices chose to limit
the extent of their agreement with Justice Powell's conclusion, Justice
Powell's scrutiny of the Davis Policy under the Equal Protection
Clause became, in a sense, a majority of one.
42. Id. at 317. For example, assume two applicants, one minority and one nonmi-
nority, have the same UGPA and MCAT scores. Under Justice Powell's opinion,
an admissions committee can offer admission to the minority applicant before it
offers admission to the nonminority applicant, since a diversity viewpoint "plus"
UGPA and MCAT score is of more value to the school than a nondiversity view-
point and the same "objective" test scores.
43. Id. at 312-13 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
44. Id. at 314. The Court acknowledged that the importance of diversity may be
greater at the undergraduate level than at the medical school level, where the
focus is on "professional competency," but concluded that the "contribution of di-
versity is substantial" even at this level, because doctors provide services to a
"heterogeneous population." Id. at 313-14. The Court also noted that, while law
schools focus on gaining legal skills and knowledge, this focus "'cannot be effec-
tive in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law inter-
acts.'" Id. at 314 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
45. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist joined in his
conclusion that the program was invalid; however, they did not consider the con-
stitutional issue since they concluded that the program violated Title VI. See
generally id. at 408-22.
46. Id. at 314.
47. Id. at 325.
48. See generally Garfield, supra note 10, at 902-03.
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2. Challenges to Affirmative Action Programs Aimed at
Achieving Diversity in the Workplace
The constitutionality of affirmative action admissions policies lay
dormant for quite some time following the Bakke decision. Then, be-
ginning in 1986, the Court reviewed a series of challenges to affirma-
tive action policies in the workplace.49 These cases, read together,
articulated clear guidelines for the application of the strict scrutiny
test,50 and confirmed that courts must apply the test when reviewing
challenges to state or federal affirmative action programs. 5 1
In the first post-Bakke decision to consider the constitutionality of
affirmative action admission policies, Justice Powell, again writing for
the plurality, took the opportunity to reaffirm the requirement that
these programs pass the strict scrutiny test before a court may pro-
nounce them as constitutional.5 2 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Edu-
cation,5 3 Justice Powel154 referred to his language in Bakke to
enunciate the present strict scrutiny test.55 The Wygant Court consid-
ered a collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Educa-
tion and a teachers' union that provided for layoffs by seniority where
the percentage of minorities laid off would exceed the percentage of
minorities employed at the time.5 6 Justice Powell wrote that where
race-based programs are concerned, the racial classification must be
justified by "a compelling state purpose, and the means chosen by the
State to effectuate that purpose must be narrowly tailored."
5 7
While Wygant reaffirmed the requirement of applying strict scru-
tiny to race-conscious policies, it did little to further define the test for
future application. The Court took the opportunity to more clearly de-
fine strict scrutiny the following year, when it decided United States v.
Paradise.5 8 The court in Paradise considered the constitutionality of
a one-black-to-one-white promotion plan that the Alabama Depart-
49. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
50. See generally Paradise, 480 U.S. 149.
51. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that courts
must apply the strict scrutiny test to judicial review of state and local govern-
ment affirmative action programs); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (mandating the use of the strict scrutiny test for federal race-
based preference programs) See generally Garfield, supra note 10.
52. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267.
53. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
54. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined the opinion.
55. "'Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
for the most exacting judicial examination.'" Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273 (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
56. Id. at 274. The Board of Education justified this race-based policy on the need for
diverse role models for its students. Id.
57. Id. at 267.
58. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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ment of Public Safety adopted pursuant to a district court consent de-
cree. 5 9 Since its mandate to promote some state troopers based on
race was a race-conscious policy, the Court applied a strict scrutiny
standard.6o The Court would uphold the decree only if the policy was
"narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental purpose." 6 1
Relying on Wygant, Justice Brennan acknowledged that there is a
compelling governmental interest in remedying present effects of past
discrimination. 6 2 However, because the Court had not previously de-
fined precisely what "narrowly tailored" meant, it availed itself of the
opportunity to provide further guidance to future courts and articu-
lated the narrowly tailored element of the strict scrutiny test. The
Justices unanimously concluded that the appropriate considerations
for finding whether a race-based program was narrowly tailored in-
cluded: (1) the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative
remedies; (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief; (3) the relation-
ship between the numerical goals and the relevant labor market; and
(4) the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties. 63
59. Id. The consent decree required the Department of Public Safety to institute this
plan as an interim measure to ensure the promotion of black state troopers. Id.
The plan followed years of court battles and ineffective consent decrees in re-
sponse to the Department's "systematic and perpetual" discrimination against
black state troopers. Id. at 153. Appellants challenged the consent decree, claim-
ing the plan granted preferential treatment to black state troopers, thereby vio-
lating the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 166.
60. Id. at 167.
61. Id. The Justices agreed that the circumstances preceding the need for the con-
sent decree, and the lower court's decision to issue the decree, sufficiently demon-
strated a compelling governmental interest in remedying past and present
discrimination by a state actor. Id. at 185. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined, "concluded that even under a strict scru-
tiny analysis, the one-black-to-one-white promotion requirement was permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 186. Justice Powell, joined by Justice
Stevens, concurred. These five Justices found that the one-black-to-one-white
hiring program was narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of remedying proven
discrimination. Id.
62. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183-85.
63. Id. at 171; see also Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 487 (1986) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court held that the
one-for-one promotion policy was justified by compelling governmental interest in
present effects of past discriminatory exclusion of African-American police of-
ficers. The majority further concluded:
When considered in light of these factors, it was amply established, and
we find that the one-for-one promotion requirement was narrowly tai-
lored to serve its several purposes, both as applied to the initial set of
promotions to the rank of corporal and as a continuing contingent order
with respect to the upper ranks.
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. The consent decrees demonstrated the necessity of the
relief. Id. at 171.
The remedy imposed here is an effective, temporary, and flexible mea-
sure. It applies only if qualified blacks are available, only if the Depart-
ment has an objective need to make promotions, and only if the
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For the next fifteen years, the Court continued to consider a series
of affirmative action challenges-all of which considered state or fed-
eral policies aimed at eradicating discrimination in the employment
sector.6 4 Reading these together with Wygant, Paradise, and Bakke,
one could articulate a clear understanding of the Court's meaning of
"strict scrutiny." The goals of eradicating present effects of past dis-
crimination 65 or of achieving diversity in the classroom could support
a compelling governmental interest. 66 The Court also provided a fur-
ther understanding of the meaning of each of the four prongs of the
Paradise "narrowly tailored" test.
6 7
Regarding the first prong of the test, the necessity of the relief and
the efficacy of alternative remedies, the Court concluded that it would
not uphold a benign race-based remedial policy unless the policy was
the least intrusive and most effective means to achieve the goals of the
entity's program.68 In determining whether a program satisfies this
element, the Court would consider the purpose of the program, the
policy reasons for the program, and the availability of alternative re-
lief.69 The Court has made clear that an affirmative action policy will
Department fails to implement a promotion procedure that does not
have an adverse impact on blacks.
Id. at 185. This Court should not have second-guessed the lower court's carefully
considered choice of the figure necessary to achieve its many purposes, especially
when that figure is hedged about with specific qualifying measures designed to
prevent any unfair impact that might arise from rigid application.
64. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 206 (1995); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
65. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986); see also Adarand,
515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
66. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314-15 (1978).
67. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
68. See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. at 266.
69. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 140, 170-74 (1987); see also Garfield,
supra note 10, at 2 nn.114-18. The Court has held that relief is necessary where
a federally funded entity predicates professional advancement on tests that yield
a variable achievement rate for different races or ethnicities. See Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). For example,
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission of New York, considered the neces-
sity for an alternative to an examination-based police hiring program. Petition-
ers, black and Hispanic police officers, were appointed to the New York City
Police Department ("NYPD") upon passing the examinations administered for en-
try level appointments. Id. As a group, the test scores of black and Hispanic
police officers were well below the test scores of nonminority candidates. Id.
Since appointments were made based on test scores, the examinations caused
blacks and Hispanics to be hired later than most nonminority candidates. Id.
The NYPD also fired police officers on a last-hired-first-fired basis. Thus, more
often than not, blacks and Hispanics were fired first. Id. at 585-86. The Court
concluded that the performance on the examination yielded a disproportionate
representation of blacks and Hispanics on the police force. Consequently, there
was a need for relief from the discriminatory effect of the standardized
examination.
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not be deemed "flexible, waivable, and temporary in application" un-
less it is easily adaptable to changing governmental needs (flexible),
easily terminated when not needed (waivable), and limited in duration
(temporary).70 In analyzing the "relationship of numerical goals to
relevant population," a reviewing court must consider the numerical
relationship between an entity's goals for its race-based program and
the desired end of the program. 71 The court may find that the pro-
gram's numerical goals bear a reasonable relationship to the relevant
population when the policy's goals are measured against a population
more closely tied to the particular group of individuals the policy seeks
to benefit.72 Finally, the requirement that the policy not favor one
group over another is really a rule-based definition of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Congress adopted the Equal Protection Clause to en-
sure that minorities, particularly African-Americans, were not denied
equal treatment under the law.73 As programs and polices aimed at
benefiting African-Americans and other minorities became more
popular, particularly following Congressional enactment of the
Civil Rights Act,74 the Court began to use the Equal Protection
70. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178; see also Croson, 488 U.S. 469. In Croson, the Court
struck down the Minority Business Enterprise legislation since it did not have
either a specific termination date or, at a minimum, a provision for reviewing the
legislation. Id. The Paradise Court found that the one-black-to-one-white hiring
plan met the second element of the narrowly tailored test, since the district court
mandated the hiring program only for as long as the department continued to
prohibit minorities from being promoted. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178. Addition-
ally, under the consent decree, the court could easily eliminate the program once
Alabama's Department of Public Safety promoted a reasonable number of black
and Hispanic troopers by no longer mandating the State's method of promotion.
Id. at 163-64. Thus, a program or policy will pass the second element of the
narrowly tailored test if the reviewing court can identify a termination provision
with a quick method of eliminating the policy once the federally-funded entity
meets the goals of the policy or program.
The Court will conclude that a need for relief exists when an "objective" test
yields a discriminatory result. Id. at 171. The Court has also found a need for
relief from educational policies that result in discrimination or separation by
race. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 742 (1992). Thus, it is likely
that where the Court finds that "objective" tests infringe on the rights of individ-
uals to advance based on race, the Court will find that relief is necessary and
must be achieved in the least intrusive manner.
71. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Statistical proof as evi-
dence of its remedial purpose supplies the court with a means for determining
that the entity offering the remedial policy had a "firm basis for concluding that
remedial action was appropriate." Id. at 293.
72. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 286. The Equal Protection Clause became a vehicle to ensure
that African-Americans received "the same rights and opportunities that white
people take for granted." Id. at 287.
74. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
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Clause to safeguard the treatment white males previously took for
granted.7 5
Following Paradise, the Court considered a series of challenges to
affirmative action programs, all of which were focused on the constitu-
tional validity of programs aimed at eradicating discrimination in the
workplace.76 In each case, the Court defined compelling governmen-
tal interest as supported by the eradication of present effects of past
discrimination. Because these challenges all centered on race-con-
scious cases aimed at improving diversity in the workplace, the Court
did not have the opportunity to endorse Justice Powell's finding that
the need for diversity in the classroom supports a compelling govern-
mental interest. Opponents of affirmative action admissions policies
seized upon the Court's omission and challenged affirmative action
admission policies on grounds that they were not supported by a com-
pelling need to eradicate present effects of past discrimination.77
B. Challenges to Affirmative Action Admission Policies in
the Circuit Courts
In 1992, almost fifteen years after the Bakke decision, individuals
began a new round of challenges to affirmative action admissions poli-
cies. This time, the circuit courts became the battleground for evalu-
ating whether such policies were permissible under the Constitution.
The first major post-Bakke challenge was fought in the Fifth Circuit,
in Hopwood v. Texas.78
Cheryl Hopwood, a single, Caucasian mother of two severely hand-
icapped children, along with two other nonminority applicants, ap-
plied to and was rejected from the University of Texas Law School
("UT") in 1992.79 At the time, UT used a dual admission policy to en-
sure its entering class was diverse in, among other things, race and
ethnicity.80 All applicants were reviewed in a similar manner. In ren-
75. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Paradise, 480
U.S. 149; Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
76. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
77. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
78. 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
79. Cheryl Hopwood and three other Caucasian applicants were rejected from the
school. Id. at 564. All four had marginal applications, so their LSAT and under-
graduate grade scores were not sufficient for acceptance under the school's gen-
eral admissions policy. Id. at 563-67. However, each of these applicant's test
scores and grades were superior to many minority candidates accepted to the
Law School that year. Id. at 563 n.32.
80. The court noted that the diversity admission policy was not entirely voluntary,
because UT adopted the policy in response to the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR")
Texas plan. Nonetheless, the court concluded that under an Equal Protection
analysis, the same level of scrutiny applied to race-conscious affirmative action
plans adopted pursuant to a consent agreement, whether or not such plans were
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dering their decision, committee members were asked to consider such
factors as undergraduate GPA, Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT")
score, undergraduate major, race, gender, past work experience, and
other relevant characteristics. 8 1 The chair of the admissions commit-
tee assigned one subcommittee to consider nonminority appli-
cants and another subcommittee to consider minority applicants.
8 2
Consequently, when reviewing a particular file, a member of
the minority subcommittee could not consider a particular appli-
cation with reference to a diverse group, since he or she did not
consider nonminority applications. Each of the plaintiffs' applica-
tions reflected LSAT and undergraduate grade scores that were
inferior to accepted nonminority applicants,8 3 but were super-
ior to many minority candidates accepted to the law school that
year.8
4
voluntarily adopted. Thus, the court would uphold the policy if it met the Su-
preme Court's requirement that (1) there was a compelling governmental interest
and (2) the policy was narrowly tailored to achieve the goals of that interest. Id.
at 569 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274); see also Croson, 488 U.S. 469; Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 299.
81. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 560-61.
82. UT had two separate reviewing subcommittees. Id. at 562. The Chair of the Ad-
missions Committee set a different presumptive admission or denial Texas Index
("TI'") number for minorities, who were reviewed by one subcommittee and for
nonminorities, who were reviewed by a separate subcommittee. Id. at 561. The
Admissions Committee based acceptance to UT for all applicants on an index
number that was a function of each applicant's combined undergraduate grade
point average ("UGPA") and LSAT score. Id. at 557 n.9. The Chair of the Admis-
sions Committee initially reviewed all applications regardless of the applicant's
residency, race or ethnic heritage, and then set a number below which students
were presumptively denied admission, and another number above which stu-
dents were automatically admitted to the school. Id. at 560-61. The subcommit-
tees reviewed applicants with numbers between the automatic admission and the
automatic rejection numbers. Id. at 561. The admissions office divided nonmi-
nority files into groups of thirty. Three members of the nonminority subcommit-
tee reviewed each nonminority applicant on an individual basis. In contrast, the
entire minority subcommittee reviewed each minority applicant as a group. In
theory, each member of the minority subcommittee was to be part of the subcom-
mittee to review nonminority files; however, one member of the minority subcom-
mittee did not review nonminority applications. Id. at 562.
83. The denied applicants were all white Texas residents. Id. at 564. Cheryl J. Hop-
wood had a TI of 199, and Kenneth Elliott, Douglas Carvell, and David Rogers
each had a TI of 197. Id. at 564-67. UT contested the ripeness of the claims of
Hopwood and Elliott, because neither was actually denied admission. Id. at 567.
Moreover, UT maintained that all four applicants lacked standing because they
could not demonstrate that they would have been granted admission in the ab-
sence of the challenged admissions policy. Id. Because the plaintiffs were not
considered for admission in a manner similar to minority students, the court
ruled that the applicants had standing to bring their claim. Id. at 567-568. See
also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jack-
sonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993).
84. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 563 n.32. Cheryl Hopwood's UGPA was 3.8 and her
LSAT was 39, which placed her in the eighty-third percentile. Id. at 564. Her
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Following their rejection, a Texas lawyer contacted these and other
rejected applicants regarding a class action suit.85 The plaintiffs
agreed and permitted the lawyer to file a lawsuit on their behalf.86
The applicants challenged UT's 1992 admission policy as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.87
In August 1994, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas found that the policy failed under the strict scrutiny
test.88 The district court, relying on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke,
did find that a compelling governmental interest existed in the
school's 1992 admissions policy, since the school's efforts were limited
to "seeking the educational benefits that flow from having a diverse
student body and to addressing the present effects of past discrimina-
father passed away when she was a young child. While in high school, Hopwood
was offered admission into Princeton, Penn State and Temple. She declined ad-
mission, however, because she had to pay for her own education and work while
attending both high school and college. Id. at 564 n.40. At the time of her appli-
cation, she was married to a military serviceman and had two children, one of
whom died at birth and the other of whom was diagnosed with severe birth de-
fects. Sam Howe Verhovek, For 4 Whites Who Sued University, Race is the Com-
mon Thread, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 1996, at A6. Hopwood declined to include
any of this information in her application to UT. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 564,
n.38. She did, however, submit a letter to the Law School on January 22, 1992,
requesting that if she were admitted, she would be able to attend the school only
on a limited basis in her first year, due to the needs of her severely handicapped
daughter. Id. at 564. Kenneth Elliott's UGPA was 2.98 and his LSAT was 167.
He is a certified public accountant, and since receiving his undergraduate degree,
Elliott has worked as an auditor or examiner for state agencies. Id. at 565.
Douglas Carvell's UGPA was 3.28. Id. at 566. After taking the LSAT twice, the
first score being in the sixty-first percentile and the second in the ninety-first, his
average score placed him in the seventy-sixth percentile. Id. at 566 n.47. In a
letter of recommendation contained in Carvell's admissions file, a professor from
Hendrix College complimented Carvell's intellect, but described his performance
as "uneven, disappointing, and mediocre." Id. at 566. David Rogers attained a
UGPA of 3.13 and an LSAT score of 166. In 1985, Rogers was dismissed from the
University of Texas (undergraduate program) due to poor scholastic performance.
He then attended the University of Houston-Downtown, where he received his
degree in professional writing in 1990. Id. at 567.
85. Michael King, Hopwood Lawyer Steven Wayne Smith Aspires to Supreme Heights,
AUSTIN CHRON., Oct. 11, 2002, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/is-
sues/dispatchl2002-10-11pols-capitol.html.
86. The lawyer Steven W. Smith became familiar with the case following his own
investigation into what he perceived to be reverse discrimination. Under the
Texas Open Records Act, Smith obtained the names of dozens of applicants with
relatively high UGPAs and LSAT scores, and mailed them letters requesting
them to serve as plaintiffs in this case. Hopwood, Elliott, Carvell, and Rogers
brought suit with Smith as their lawyer. Verhovek, supra note 84, at A6.
87. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553.
88. Id. at 584-85.
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tory practices."8 9 The court rejected the policy, however, because it
was not narrowly tailored to meet the goals of achieving a diverse
class.90 Ms. Hopwood and her co-plaintiffs appealed the decision to
the Fifth Circuit. The divided court 9 1 overturned the lower court deci-
sion, and struck down the policy as violating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
9 2
The Court of Appeals permitted the law school to reconstitute its
admissions policy, requiring the school to review minority and nonmi-
nority candidates as a group. 9 3 A majority of the panel broadly ruled
that UT may not use race as a factor in law school admissions, and
suggested that every school in its jurisdiction is prohibited from doing
the same. 9 4 The majority rejected Justice Powell's holding in Bakke95
that there is a compelling governmental interest in the attainment of
a diverse student body. The judges wrote that Justice Powell's opinion
89. Id. at 570 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)).
In other words, the compelling governmental interest was supported by both the
need to diversify the school's entering class and the present effects of past dis-
crimination. The court concluded that without the diversity admission policy, UT
would not have achieved a diverse student body. Id. at 572. Recent Office of Civil
Rights findings, coupled with the State's "long history of discrimination against
blacks and Mexican Americans" and UT's history of racial discrimination, were
sufficient evidence to establish that the remedial purpose of UT's diversity admis-
sion policy constituted a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 572.
90. Id. at 579. The court found that the diversity admission policy met the first three
prongs of the narrowly tailored test. Id. at 569-78. First, UT sufficiently demon-
strated that the race-based admissions policy was necessary since it was impossi-
ble to achieve diversity without an affirmative action admission policy. Id. at
573. Second, the program was temporary in nature, because the objective of UT
was to narrow the gap progressively so that, at some point in time, UT would no
longer need a diversity admission policy. Id. at 575. Third, UTs goals for minor-
ity enrollment as a percent of total enrollment bore a reasonable relationship to
the percent of minority college graduates in Texas. Id. Ultimately, the court held
that the diversity admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment because
it failed to afford each individual applicant a comparison with the entire pool of
applicants. Id. at 579. The court recognized the laudable and imperative goal of
diversity in the education system. Moreover, it agreed with Justice Powell that
race or ethnicity could be considered a "plus" factor in a school's consideration of a
particular applicant. Id. at 577. The court noted that when weighing nontradi-
tional factors in the admissions decision, it is permissible for an admissions com-
mittee to choose an applicant with a lower LSAT and/or UGPA. Such an
applicant may be preferable based on qualifications that include nonobjective fac-
tors. Id. Thus, the court ruled in a manner consistent with Bakke, holding that
race can be a factor in considering a candidate's application for admission, so long
as a school does not use race to meet goals or to set quotas.
91. It was a two-to-one ruling. Judge Jerry Smith delivered the opinion of the court,
with Judge Weiner filing a specially concurring opinion.
92. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1996).
93. Id. at 962.
94. Id. The panel also dismissed an appeal requesting intervention in the case by
two Black student groups for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 959.
95. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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in Bakke was not binding, since it was not the general consensus of
the Court.9
6
The Hopwood majority's rejection of Justice Powell's decision in
Bakke prompted many to speculate that the Supreme Court would
take certiorari following UT's appeal. On July 1, 1996, however, the
Supreme Court denied the State's petition for certiorari,97 thereby let-
ting the Fifth Circuit decision stand. Although the Court did not issue
an opinion accompanying the decision to deny certiorari,98 Justice
Ginsburg wrote a brief opinion, joined by Justice Souter.99 Justice
Ginsburg explained that her decision to deny certiorari was based on a
finding that UT had already changed its 1992 admissions policy to re-
flect the district court decision, making the issue moot.1 0 0 She sug-
gested, however, that there would be a time in the future when the
Court would address "the important question raised in this
petition."101
96. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. In order to establish a compelling governmental inter-
est, the judges looked to the Supreme Court's definition of a compelling govern-
mental interest in Title VII employment discrimination cases. The judges would
only find a compelling governmental interest if there were present effects of past
discrimination. Id. at 949. As evidence of the present effects of past discrimina-
tion, the lower court relied on the Office of Civil Rights findings of discrimination
throughout the Law School and the entire UT system. In contrast, the Fifth Cir-
cuit majority defined the proper unit for analysis of the effects of discrimination
at the Law School. Id. At UT, the judges held, there were no recognizable pre-
sent effects of the Law School's past discrimination. Id. at 951. The majority
concluded that since UT could not show prior discrimination by the Law School, it
could not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to
achieve a diverse student body. Id. at 962. In a concurring opinion, Judge Wei-
ner agreed that the 1992 UT admissions policy did not pass strict scrutiny. Id. at
966. The UT policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity, since it set one
TI range for African-Americans, a different range for Mexican-Americans, and a
different range for other races. Id. at 936. However, Judge Weiner disagreed
with the majority, which said that diversity could never support a compelling
governmental interest. Id. at 962. He wrote that Supreme Court precedent sup-
ports the proposition that achieving diversity in a public graduate or professional
school could be a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 964. Ultimately,
Judge Weiner wrote that the definition and application of a compelling govern-
mental interest where education is concerned should be left to constitutional in-
terpretation, and he perceived "no 'compelling' reason to rush in where the
Supreme Court fears-or at least declines-to tread." Id. at 965.
97. Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
98. Id. at 1033 ("Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit denied.").
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. ("We must await a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy
before addressing the important question raised in this petition."). Justice Gins-
burg's opinion in the denial of certiorari suggests that the definition of a compel-
ling governmental interest in educational race-based programs remains open to
Supreme Court consideration.
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In the years following Hopwood, new affirmative action challenges
in the federal courts attempted to force the Court, both directly and
indirectly, to resolve the critical question of whether Justice Powell's
plurality definition of the compelling governmental interest prong of
the strict scrutiny test was binding. Many of these challenges stalled
in the district courts.1 0 2 Between 2000 and 2002, however, four cases
reached various circuit courts on the merits of whether the affirmative
action admissions policies of postsecondary institutions violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.1 0 3 The
holdings of these cases created a clear split among the circuits, which
ultimately forced the Supreme Court to resolve the issue of the weight
of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.
In Smith v. University of Washington Law School,104 the Ninth
Circuit ruled that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was binding on its
102. But see Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999). Most stalled because of lack of
standing. In the only affirmative action case to reach the Supreme Court since
Bakke in 1971, prior to the recent ascension of Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Court was unable to issue a ruling on the merits
of the University of Texas's admissions policy; rather the Court held that "where
there is no allegation of an on-going or imminent constitutional violation to sup-
port a claim for forward-looking relief, the government's conclusive demonstra-
tion that it would have made the same decision absent the alleged discrimination
precludes any finding of liability." Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21. Not only did the Su-
preme Court rely on the school's showing that Lesage was denied admission for
race-neutral reasons, the Court also relied on Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551
(W.D. Tex. 1994), in part, to find that Lesage lacked standing to pursue his dis-
crimination claim. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 22. The University of Texas did not deny
that the year Lesage applied, the school considered race at some point during its
admissions process. Id. at 19. However, the decision in Hopwood being binding
on the Texas school, the Supreme Court was satisfied that Lesage was barred
from seeking forward-looking relief. Id. at 22. Although the Supreme Court was
not in a position to evaluate the University of Texas's use of race in its admissions
policy given its finding that Lesage lacked standing, its reliance on Hopwood in
issuing this ruling added a hint of legitimacy to Hopwood itself.
Despite that an affirmative action case has reached Court of Appeals in nearly
every circuit, many have applied the Supreme Court's holding in Lesage to side-
step the issue of whether race-conscious admissions policies are constitutional.
In both Farmer v. Ramsay, 43 Fed. Appx. 547 (4th Cir. 2002), and Wooden v.
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 247 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir.
2001), the courts held that the respective plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the
issue. Rather than examine either schools' admitted use of race in its admissions
policy, the courts spent much of their opinions recounting the plaintiffs' applica-
tions and the race-neutral reasons that the schools rejected the applicants. See
generally Farmer, 43 Fed. Appx. 547; Wooden, 247 F.3d 1262. Thus, these cases
have added little to the discussion of whether race-conscious admissions pro-
grams are constitutionally permissible.
103. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law
Sch., 233 F.3d 118 (9th Cir. 2000); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D.
Mich. 2000).
104. 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
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court, and that "the attainment of a diverse student body 'is a consti-
tutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education."o105
In 1997, three Caucasian applicantsiO6 to the law school challenged
the school's affirmative action admissions policy on the grounds that it
violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 2000d.107 Plaintiffs, and the
University of Washington ("UW"), as defendant, stipulated that from
1994 to 1998 the law school had used race as a criterion in its admis-
sions process so that it could ensure that it would enroll a diverse en-
tering class.108 In 1998, the State of Washington adopted 1-200,1o9
which precluded schools from granting "preferential treatment" to any
individual "on the basis of race."11o In response, the president of the
university issued a directive, and UW voluntarily refrained from us-
105. Id. at 1197 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12
(1978)). The court concluded:
The district court correctly decided that Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke described the law and would require a determination that a prop-
erly designed and operated race-conscious admissions program at the
law school of the University of Washington would not be in violation of
Title VI or the Fourteenth Amendment. It was also correct when it de-
termined that Bakke has not been overruled by the Supreme Court.
Thus, at our level of the judicial system, Justice Powell's opinion re-
mains the law.... [Hiowever, the Law School has encountered a peripe-
teia in its own state; it is bound by 1-200, which precludes it from
granting "preferential treatment" to any individual "on the basis of
race." That has rendered Smith's request for prospective relief moot be-
cause we "[should] not assume that a university, professing to employ a
facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover
for the functional equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith
[should] be presumed in the absence of a showing to the contrary...."
Id. at 1201 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19).
106. Regarding the three, the court noted the following:
On July 1, 1997, [Katuria] Smith filed suit against the law school alleg-
ing illegal discrimination against Caucasians and others on the basis of
their race, which resulted in their being denied admission to the Law
School. From at least 1994 to December of 1998, the Law School did use
race as a criterion in its admissions process, so that it could assure the
enrollment of a diverse student body. There is no dispute about that.
Katuria Smith was denied admission in 1994, but she attended another
law school and obtained her law degree there. Angela Rock was denied
admission in 1995. She, too, attended another law school and obtained
her law degree. Michael Pyle was denied admission in 1996, but when
he reapplied in 1999 [after the Law School terminated its overt racial
policy] he was admitted.
Id. at 1191-92.
107. Id. at 1191 (alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 2000e-2000e-17).
108. Id.
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400(1) (1998).
110. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192. On November 3, 1998, the State of Washington passed
Initiative Measure 200, which stipulated in part that, "[tihe state shall not dis-
criminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.60.400(1).
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ing race as a factor in its admissions policy."' Because of the law
school's voluntary decision to comply with 1-200, UW argued to the
district court that the issue was moot. 11 2 Plaintiffs argued that the
claims were not moot because of uncertainty regarding the law
school's actual interpretation and application of 1-200.113 The district
court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss the claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief, since the issue was now moot due to
the State's adoption of 1-200.114
The court made the necessary findings under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b)115 and designated two controlling questions of law for the
Ninth Circuit to resolve: "(1) whether educational diversity is a com-
pelling governmental interest that meets the requirement of 'strict
scrutiny' for race-conscious measures under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution; and (2) whether race may be
considered only for remedial purposes."116 Plaintiffs appealed both
the denial of injunctive relief and the issue on the merits. 117 The
Ninth Circuit granted both applications.ll 8
As to the first issue, the court found that the claim was indeed
moot in light of 1-200.119 The Smith court then considered the district
court's decision to deny the plaintiffs' partial summary judgment mo-
tion, which found that, under Bakke and its progeny, "race could be
used as a factor in educational admissions decisions, even where that
was not done for remedial purposes."120 In upholding the district
111. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192.
The new admission policy did retain a diversity clause, which stated that
"[ilmportant academic objectives are furthered by students from diverse
background [s]" and then went on to set out a non exhaustive list of fac-
tors as indicative of diversity including "persevering or personal adver-
sity or other social hardships; having lived in a foreign country or spoken
a language other than English at home; career goals; employment his-
tory; educational background; evidence of and potential for leadership;
special talents; geographic diversity or unique life experiences." Race it-
self, along with color and national origin, were excluded from the list.
Id.
112. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) (Requiring a writing where a district judge makes an
order not otherwise appealable and finds that such order "involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation.").
116. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192.
117. Id. at 1193.
118. Id. at 1192-93.
119. Id. at 1193 ("The court found that the district court had properly determined that
it could offer no relief of a prospective nature once 1-200 and its aftermath had
accomplished all that a judgment could accomplish."). The court noted that time
and events, including societal opinion, outstripped the court processes. Id.
120. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1196.
2OO5
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court's finding that UW could consider race as a factor in its admis-
sions policy, Judge Fernandez acknowledged that the Supreme Court
clearly required that any affirmative action admissions policy was
subject to the strictest scrutiny, and would not be permissible unless it
was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.
12 1
Adopting the language from Justice Powell's opinion, Judge Fernan-
dez concluded, "'[tihe State certainly has a legitimate and substantial
interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling
effects of identified discrimination,"1 22 and the attainment of a di-
verse student body "'is a constitutionally permissible goal for an insti-
tution of higher education."1 23 Thus, "ethnic diversity" can be "one
element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in
attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body."124 Ultimately,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and in-
junctive relief were moot, and therefore never considered the issue of
whether UW's program was narrowly tailored.
125
In 2001, following Smith, the Eleventh Circuit came to the con-
trary conclusion regarding the validity of Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke.126 In Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Geor-
gia,12 7 the Court considered an appeal from the district court, which
held that the University of Georgia's ("UGA") policy of awarding a
fixed numerical bonus to nonwhite and male applicants, which it did
not give to white and female applicants, was unconstitutional.' 28 On
appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, UGA argued that the school's policy
should be upheld because it was narrowly tailored to meet what Jus-
tice Powell acknowledged in Bakke as a compelling governmental in-
terest in admitting a diverse class. 12 9 The majority concluded that
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was not binding under Marks v.
United States,13 0 which held that "'[wihen a fragmented Court decides
a case . . . "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the nar-
121. Id. at 1197.
122. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)) (al-
teration in original).
123. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12).
124. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 at 314. "It has been declared that '[wihen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the as-
sent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.'" Smith, 233. F.3d at 1199 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977)).
125. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1195.
126. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
127. 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
128. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga.
2000).
129. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1245.
130. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
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rowest grounds."'"131 Applying a Marks-type analysis, the Johnson
court concluded, similarly to Hopwood, that Justice Powell's decision,
read with Justice Brennan's concurrence, supported the very narrow
principle that race could never be a factor in admissions policies.13 2
The Eleventh Circuit clearly articulated its conclusion that for these
reasons, Justice Powell's decision was not binding on its court. 133
Despite its findings, the court was still willing to uphold the policy
if it passed the strict scrutiny test, as articulated in Paradise.134
First, UGA had to demonstrate that its policy was designed to eradi-
cate present effects of past discrimination. 3 5 Secondly, the school
had to prove that its policy was narrowly tailored to meet the stated
compelling governmental interest.13 6
The Johnson court was the first to note that the Paradise test,
while useful, was not ideal for evaluating an affirmative action admis-
sions policy.13 7 Because neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Su-
preme Court "has had occasion to define the contours of the narrow
tailoring inquiry in a case involving a university's race-conscious ad-
missions policy,"'138 the court took it upon itself to propose a modified
Paradise test, which better suited evaluating race-conscious policies
set to achieve diversity in the classroom. Under the Johnson test,
a court evaluating a school admissions program designed to serve a compel-
ling interest in obtaining the educational benefits associated with a diverse
student body should examine: (1) whether the policy uses race in a rigid or
mechanical way that does not take sufficient account of the different contribu-
tions to diversity that individual candidates may offer; (2) whether the policy
fully and fairly takes account of race-neutral factors which may contribute to
a diverse student body; (3) whether the policy gives an arbitrary or dispropor-
tionate benefit to members of the favored racial groups; and (4) whether the
school has genuinely considered, and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral al-
ternatives for creating student body diversity. The foregoing factors essen-
tially correspond to all of the factors adopted in Paradise (other than duration)
for affirmative action plans generally.
1 3 9
131. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (internal citation
omitted)).
132. Id. at 1248.
133. Id. at 1245. "Simply put, Justice Powell's opinion does not establish student body
diversity as a compelling interest for purposes of this case." Id. at 1249. The
Court also said, "We need not, and do not, resolve in this opinion whether student
body diversity ever may be a compelling interest supporting a university's consid-
eration of race in its admissions process." Id. at 1244.
134. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).
135. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1252. The burden lay with party proposing the program.
Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1253.
138. Id. at 1252.
139. Id. at 1253.
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Ultimately, the court struck down UGA's policy as failing the nar-
rowly tailored test.140 Its policy of awarding diversity "bonus" points
to certain applicants granted a disproportionate benefit to nonwhite
applicants. 14 1 The court advanced solid reasons for its modification of
the Paradise test. At the outset, inquiring into "the relationship be-
tween the numerical goal and the percentage of minority group mem-
•bers in the relevant population" may be unhelpful where the
university does not target a specific number of minority applicants for
admission.- 42 In addition, "a limited inquiry into 'the flexibility of the
policy' may not adequately reflect the paramount importance of the
requirement that, to serve validly the end of diversity, a race-con-
scious admissions policy . . .assess each applicant as an individual
rather than a member of a particular racial group."143 Ultimately
Judge Marcus, writing for the majority, advanced that the Paradise
narrowly tailored test was inappropriate for considering challenges to
affirmative action admission policies.144
The same year that the Eleventh Circuit decided Johnson, the
Sixth Circuit was faced with two appeals concerning affirmative ac-
tion admissions policies at the University of Michigan-one at the un-
dergraduate level and one at the graduate level. The first challenge,
Gratz v. Bollinger, was filed by a Caucasian female and a Caucasian
male, each of whom was denied admission to the University of Michi-
gan's School of Literature Arts and Science ("LSA").145 Jennifer Gratz
and Patrick Hamacher challenged LSA's admissions policy, alleging
that it improperly used race as a factor in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 14
6
The faculty at the University of Michigan had adopted its admis-
sions policy to accomplish its stated goal of admitting a diverse class
for the benefit of all students in the classroom. 147 From 1995 to 1998,
LSA's admissions policy specifically "protected" a certain number of
140. Id. at 1254.
141. Id.
142. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1252.
143. Id. Judge Marcus further wrote, "Similarly, while it may be constitutionally ac-
ceptable in limited circumstances for 'innocent' members of a once-favored racial
group to bear some burden when a defendant seeks to remediate its past discrim-
ination, this view of competing racial groups has no meaning when a university's
professed goal is to create a diverse student body, and the burden imposed by a
racial preference intended to achieve diversity cannot so readily be justified on
this basis." Id.
144. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1254.
145. Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209, 210 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev'd, 122 F. Supp. 2d
811 (E.D. Mich. 2000), affd en banc, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). The complaint was
filed on Oct. 14, 1997. Id.
146. Gratz, 183 F.R.D. at 210.
147. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
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spots for minority candidates.148 In 1998, LSA modified its admis-
sions program.14 9 The school used a 150-point scale, which it called a
SCUGA scale, to rate applicants.150 Students received a certain num-
ber of points for scholarship, curriculum, underrepresented minority
status, geographical location, and alumni relation. Students were as-
signed twenty points if they were underrepresented minorities.151
LSA did not set aside a fixed number of seats for applicants.152
The admissions committee reviewed only applicants who attained
a certain SCUGA number.153 Once an applicant earned enough
points to make it to the individual review phase of the admissions pol-
icy, the committee disregarded the applicant's SCUGA score.15 4 At
this point, it paid particular attention to the qualities that would
make the candidate a suitable student for matriculation at the
school.155 LSA also had a policy of allowing counselors to "flag" appli-
cations of certain students who would otherwise not have passed the
first selection procedure, allowing for a limited number of applicants
who did not have the necessary SCUGA score to be considered in the
individual review phase of the admissions proceedings.156
148. Id. at 826-29. "Grids" were used to help review applicants; there were separate
grids for minority and nonminority students. Id. at 827. On these grids, SAT
scores were represented on the horizontal axis and high school grade point aver-
age on the vertical axis. Id. at 826. The admissions office would plot an appli-
cant's SAT and high school GPA on the grid to determine whether the applicant
should be reviewed for admission. Id. at 826-27. LSA used a rolling admissions
policy, which meant that as applications were being received, applicants were
continuously being accepted and enrolled. The rolling admissions made it more
difficult for the LSA to ensure that a critical mass of minority applicants were
accepted. Id. at 831. To rectify this problem, they reserved a specific number of
seats for minority students, which guaranteed that there would be enough minor-
ity students in the incoming class. Id.
149. Id. at 827.
150. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 254-55 (2003). The SCUGA factors were: S-
socioeconomic status, C-curriculum, U-underrepresented minority, G-geography,
and A-alumni.
151. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
152. See id. at 825.
153. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
154. Id. at 257.
155. See id. at 256. Under the 1999 admissions program,
[c]ounselors may flag an applicant for review by the committee if he or
she is academically prepared, has a [certain] selection index score ...
and possesses one of several qualities valued by the University. These
qualities include "high class rank, unique life experiences, challenges,
circumstances, interests or talents, socioeconomic disadvantage, and un-
derrepresented race, ethnicity, or geography."
Id. at 278. "[11n 'rare circumstances,' an admissions counselor may flag an appli-
cant with a selection index score below the designated levels if the counselor has
reason to believe from reading the entire file that the score does not reflect the
applicant's true promise." Id.
156. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
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The trial court, following the Supreme Court's mandate, consid-
ered whether LSA's declared goal of achieving a racially diverse class
was a compelling governmental interest, and whether the SCUGA
number system was narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 15 7 The
district court rejected the 1995-1998 plan,158 but held that the
SCUGA plan, as adopted in 1999, was indeed narrowly tailored to
meet a compelling governmental interest of achieving a diverse class-
room. 15 9 Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit.16o
Concurrent with the Court's consideration of Gratz, Barbara Grut-
ter challenged the University of Michigan Law School's ("Law School")
admissions policy.161 The Law School's 1992 admissions policy called
for enrollment of a "critical mass of minority students" as a means of
ensuring a diverse student body.162 Under the written policy, the
157. Id.
158. Id. at 831-33. The Court held that the admissions plan from 1995 to 1998 was
not narrowly tailored. Id. There were separate grids for minorities, and because
of that, a certain number of nonminority students would be automatically re-
jected without even having their applications examined. Id. at 832-33. The
Court held that the separate grids might not be constitutionally impermissible on
their face, but when combined with the automatic exclusions and the seats that
were reserved for minorities, the program was unconstitutional. Id. at 833.
159. Id. at 827-31. The LSA defended its program as narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling interest of diversity. Id at 816. The defendant-intervenors presented
a separate justification for the program. They maintained that the admissions
program was additionally constitutional as a remedy for the past and current
effects of racial discrimination. Id. The Court held this was not a compelling
interest. The Court held that the legal standard was that the discrimination
must be "identified discrimination." Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790,
792-92 (E.D. Mich. 2001). There must be a strong basis in the evidence that the
remedial action is necessary before the affirmative action program can be used.
Id. at 793-94. A generalized assertion of past discrimination is not enough. Id.
at 793. When the race-based classifications of an affirmative action plan are
challenged, the proponents of the plan have the burden of persuasion. Id. The
plaintiffs initially argued that since the school maintained that their program
was intended to achieve diversity, the defendant-intervenors could not say that it
was to rectify past discrimination. Id. at 794-95. The Court disagreed, and said
that in affirmative action cases, one must look beyond the articulated reason and
see if it is genuine; the defendant-intervenors were allowed to present evidence
on this issue. Id. The defendant-intervenors presented evidence about past and
present racial discrimination and hostility. The Court believed that there was
racial hostility on campus, but that there was not enough evidence that the Uni-
versity was a participant in it, and it did not meet the level of a compelling inter-
est, which would justify an affirmative action program. Id. at 792-802.
160. Gratz v. Bollinger, 309 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2001).
161. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
162. Id. at 832. The Law School's admissions policy was adopted in 1992 and it ex-
presses the school's desire "to admit a group of students who individually and
collectively are among the most capable students applying to American law
schools in a given year.... Collectively, we seek a mix of students with varying
backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from each other." Id. at
825. The policy stated that while grades would be a factor, the rationale for ad-
mitting students with lower scores was that they "may help achieve that diver-
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school gave considerable weight to an applicant's undergraduate GPA
and his or her LSAT scores. 163 Applicants who were not automati-
cally admitted or rejected based on objective scores were sent to the
committee for review. According to the Law School's written policy,
those reviewing applications for admission were encouraged to con-
sider factors including recommendations, quality of one's undergradu-
ate institution, essays, course selection, and whether the applicant
had a perspective or experience that would contribute to a diverse stu-
dent body.164 The policy highlighted examples of those who could of-
fer varying perspectives, including a concert pianist, someone who
spoke five languages, or a member of an underrepresented minority
group.165
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan, Southern Division subjected the Law School's admissions policy
to strict scrutiny.166 The court concluded that Justice Powell's major-
ity opinion in Bakke was not binding, and therefore the Law School's
mission of admitting a diverse class was not a compelling governmen-
tal interest to justify including race in the list of nonobjective factors
that could contribute to an applicant's success.167 The district court
further found that the admissions policy was not narrowly tailored,
concluding that the Law School's goal of admitting a "critical mass"
was practically indistinguishable from a quota, and was such an
amorphous figure that a program could never be narrowly tailored to
achieve it.16s Judge Friedman issued an injunction prohibiting the
sity which has the potential to enrich everyone's education and thus make a law
school class stronger than the sum of its parts." Id. at 827. The School hoped
that "[b]y enrolling a 'critical mass' of minority students, we have ensured their
ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School." Id. at
828.
163. Id. at 825-26. The objective factors of each candidate were initially evaluated on
a grid with an applicant's undergraduate GPA plotted on a vertical axis and his
or her LSAT score plotted on a horizontal axis. As an applicant's objective num-
bers moved to the upper right of the grid, his or her chances of admission in-
creased. Id.
164. Id. at 826.
165. Id. at 826-27.
166. Id. at 848.
167. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 848-49. The defendants argued that Bakke stands for
the conclusion that diversity is a compelling government interest, but the court
disagreed. Id. at 844. The court held that Bakke is not binding, because Justice
Powell's opinion was not joined by any other Justices, and recent Supreme Court
cases have not looked favorably on racial classifications. Id. at 844-46. The court
agreed that diversity does have important educational benefits, but felt that a
distinction needed to be drawn between viewpoint diversity and racial diversity.
Id. at 849. The court felt that viewpoint diversity provides benefits but that the
connection between race and viewpoint is tenuous. Id. Therefore, racial diversity
was not a compelling interest. Id.
168. Id. at 851. The court found that the school's policy was not narrowly tailored
because: (1) since "critical mass" is such an amorphous figure, there is no way
20051
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Law School from considering race in its admissions policy.16 9 In re-
sponse to the district court decision, the Law School petitioned the
Sixth Circuit.170 The Court of Appeals heard the Grutter appeal en
banc on the same day as Gratz.
171
The main issues before the Sixth Circuit were whether the district
court erred in concluding that Justice Powell's opinion was not bind-
ing172 and, if so, whether the Law School's admissions policy passed
constitutional muster under Powell's reasoning in Bakke. 173 As to the
first issue, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court improp-
erly applied a Marks1 74 analysis to the plurality opinion in Bakke.
1 75
In Bakke, Justice Brennan's concurrence, which was joined by three
other Justices, signaled his agreement with Justice Powell that diver-
sifying a student body could be a compelling governmental interest.
1 76
that a program can be narrowly tailored to achieve it; (2) the use of race is not
limited in time and the Supreme Court has been highly critical of programs that
are not limited in duration; (3) the school's desire to achieve a critical mass is
practically indistinguishable from a quota system; (4) there is no logical reason
why the school gave preferences to some minorities and not to others such as
Arabs and southern and eastern Europeans; and (5) the Law School has appar-
ently failed to investigate alternative means for achieving minority enrollment.
Id. at 850-52.
169. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874. After the Grutter decision, the University defend-
ants petitioned the district court for a stay of the injunction while the case was
appealed. Id. The district court per Judge Friedman denied the motion. Id. The
district court denied the motion because: (1) the defendants did not show the exis-
tence of serious questions about the merits of the decision; (2) the Law School did
not show a certain and immediate threat of irreparable harm; and (3) the inter-
ests of the other parties and the public weigh against granting the stay of the
injunction. Id.
170. Grutter v. Bollinger, 247 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2001). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court because: (1) there were
serious questions about the merits of the case because the district courts in Grut-
ter and Gratz had different interpretations about the meaning of Bakke, and they
were both before the Sixth Circuit on appeal; and (2) the Law School did show
irreparable harm, because there would be a tremendous disruption of their ad-
missions selection process for the class of 2001-2002. Id. at 633.
171. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
172. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 738-39 (6th Cir. 2002).
173. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 746.
174. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1970).
175. Grutter, 288 F.3d 739-40. Justice Martin, writing for the majority, cited Marks's
holding that, "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds." Id. at 739 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 196).
176. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 741. The Sixth Circuit explained that Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion in Bakke used intermediate scrutiny, while Justice Powell used
strict scrutiny. Id. Since the set of constitutionally permissible uses of race
under intermediate scrutiny necessarily include those permissive under strict
scrutiny, Justice Powell's opinion would allow the most limited use of race.
Therefore, it was the narrowest rationale that supported the opinion and is the
binding precedent. Id.
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Furthermore, the Court found that its subsequent treatment of Bakke,
in cases like Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,177 supports the conclu-
sion that Powell's position in Bakke represents the holding of the
case.s7 8 Judge Martin held that, since, under a Marks analysis, Jus-
tice Powell's decision in Bakke is binding on the courts, it should re-
main the law until the Supreme Court expressly overrules it.179
Once the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court misapplied
controlling law, it considered whether, under Bakke, the Law School's
admissions policy was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling gov-
ernmental interest of admitting a diverse entering class.' 8 0 The court
recognized that the Law School's admissions policy closely tracked the
Harvard Plan, which the Bakke Court suggested would pass strict
scrutiny.181 Specifically, the Law School policy did not use quotas,
only considered race, ethnicity, and other soft variables as potential
"plus" factors in an applicant's file, and read and evaluated each appli-
cant individually.182 For these reasons, it was narrowly tailored. The
court further considered the school's policy of reviewing the race and
ethnicity of the admitted applicants. 8 3 The goal of this practice, ac-
cording to the Law School, was to ensure that the school enrolled a
"critical mass" of underrepresented minority students, so that a few
wouldn't feel isolated or as though they must be the spokesperson for
an entire group of people.18 4 Enrolling a critical mass, the Law School
offered, ensured that the entire class would obtain the benefits of an
academically diverse student body.185 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit
Court was satisfied that a "critical mass" did not equal a quota, and
the court upheld the Law School's admissions policy.'
8 6
177. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
178. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 743. The Sixth Circuit felt that its interpretation of Justice
Brennan's position in Bakke was correct, because in Metro Broadcasting, Justice
Brennan wrote an opinion that cited Bakke for the proposition that "'a diverse
student body' contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally
permissible goal' on which race-conscious university admissions program may be
predicated." Id. at 743 (citing Metro Broad., Inc., v. FCC, 497 U.S. at 568 (inter-
nal citations omitted)).
179. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 743-44.
180. Id. at 744.
181. Id. The Grutter court held that the Law School used race only as a "plus," which
closely mirrored the Harvard Plan cited favorably in Bakke, and was therefore
narrowly tailored. Id. In Bakke, Justice Powell held that the Harvard Plan was
constitutional because race was only utilized as a "plus," but did not insulate a
minority applicant from comparison with other applicants. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978).
182. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 744-46.
183. Id. at 737.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 747. The plaintiffs alleged that the so-called "critical mass" was in reality a
disguised quota, because it always resulted in a range of 10-17% minority stu-
dents. Id. The Sixth Circuit disagreed and held that the Law School had no fixed
20051
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The petitioners from the Grutter case filed a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court following the Sixth Circuit decision.187 The Gratz pe-
titioners also asked the Court to grant certiorari, even though the
Sixth Circuit had not yet rendered an opinion in that case, so that the
Court could address the constitutionality of affirmative action admis-
sions policies "in a wider range of circumstances."ss On December 2,
2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gratz and Grutter.i8 9
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT APPLICATION OF THE
STRICT SCRUTINY TEST TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
ADMISSION POLICIES: THE GRATZ AND
GRUTTER DECISIONS
On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States issued
separate opinions in the Grutter and Gratz cases. 190 Because the
plaintiffs in each case challenged the respective affirmative action ad-
missions policies as violating the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
reviewed each policy under the strict scrutiny test.19 ' The policies,
therefore, would only withstand a constitutional challenge if the
schools could "demonstrate that the . . . use of race in [their] current
admissions program[s] employs 'narrowly tailored measures that fur-
ther compelling governmental interests."'192 Both the Grutter and
Gratz Courts swiftly accepted, as binding, Justice Powell's majority
opinion in Bakke, and presumed that there was a compelling govern-
mental interest in achieving a diverse entering class. 193 The opinions
goal or target. Id. at 747-48. The Grutter court felt that Bakke allows schools to
pay some attention to race and that relying on Bakke, over a period of time, will
always result in a percentage range of minority students. Id. at 748. The Grutter
court concluded:
In light of (1) the overwhelming testimony by Law School Professors,
admissions counselors and deans that the Law School does not employ a
quota or otherwise reserve seats for under-represented minority appli-
cants and (2) Justice Powell's instruction that lower courts presume that
academic institutions act in good faith in operating their "plus" pro-
grams, we simply cannot conclude that the Law School is using the
"functional equivalent" of the Davis Medical School quota struck down in
Bakke.
Id.
187. Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002).
188. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 260 (2003).
189. Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002); Grutter, 537 U.S. 1043.
190. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
191. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
192. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995)).
193. The lower courts had taken considerable time in their opinions to discuss
whether Bakke, was binding precedent and reached varying conclusions. In
Grutter, the Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals held that Bakke
was binding precedent using the Supreme Court's Marks analysis. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739-43 (6th Cir. 2002). In Gratz, the United States Dis-
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differed, however, in their ultimate conclusions regarding whether
each school's policy was narrowly tailored to meet that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
The Gratz Court struck down LSA's admissions policy, because it
was not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental inter-
est of achieving a diverse student body.194 Writing for the major-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, similarly held
that Powell's opinion from Bakke was binding. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp.
2d 811, 819-20 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Conversely, in Grutter, the district court held
that Powell's opinion from Bakke was not binding precedent. 137 F. Supp. 2d
821, 844-50 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). Despite all of
the controversy and varying opinions among the lower courts, the Supreme Court
did not spend a significant amount of time addressing the issue in its opinion.
The Court simply stated that "today we endorse Justice Powell's view that stu-
dent body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race
in university admissions." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
194. 539 U.S. at 247. Before the Supreme Court addressed the merits of the case, it
spent considerable time discussing whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring
the case. Id. at 244-46. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens-who was
joined by Justice Souter-contended that the case should be dismissed because
the plaintiffs lacked standing. Since the petitioners had already enrolled at other
universities before the complaint was filed, they would not benefit from the judg-
ment and therefore lacked standing. Id. at 282-83. Jennifer Gratz applied to the
LSA for the 1995-1996 class, but when she was wait-listed, she decided to attend
the University of Michigan at Dearborn, from which she graduated in 1999. Id.
Patrick Hamacher applied to the LSA for the 1997-1998 class, but when he was
wait-listed he decided to attend Michigan State University and graduated in
2001. Id. Hamacher alleged that he intended to apply to transfer to the LSA if
the admissions policies were altered. Id. When the petitioners applied for class
action certification under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) to seek declaratory and injunctive
relief, the University challenged their petition by pointing out that Hamacher
suffered "no threat of imminent future injury" and could therefore not be a class
representative. Id. at 283. The district court disagreed and held that Hamacher
had standing to seek injunctive relief because of his intent to transfer. Id. In the
subsequent case, the Court held that the LSA's admissions policies from 1995 to
1998 (which were in place when the petitioners applied) were unconstitutional,
while the new policy for 1999 to 2000 was constitutional. Id. at 283-84. When
the petitioners sought certiorari on the ruling for the policy from 1999-2000, the
LSA did not cross-motion for a review of the ruling on the policies for 1995-1998.
Id. Justice Stevens held, therefore, that the only part of the case before the Court
was the district court's judgment upholding the LSA's new policies. Id. Justice
Stevens held that petitioners had standing to seek damages for wrongful denial of
their applications, but that these past damages did not impose standing to seek
injunctive relief for future third parties, because one must show that one person-
ally faces an imminent threat of future injury. Id. Justice Stevens did not be-
lieve that Hamacher's intent to transfer conveyed standing because (1) there was
no evidence that he actually applied to transfer; (2) the transfer policy was not
addressed by the district court and was not before the Supreme Court, and dif-
fered significantly from the normal admissions policy, including the fact that it
did not use the point system; and (3) the differences in the policies made it un-
likely that an injunctive modification of the freshman admissions policies would
affect the transfer policy. Id. at 285-86. Justice Stevens also held that the class
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ity,19 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the fatal flaw in the
University's admissions policy was its failure to provide an individual
review of each candidate.196 LSA's policy of automatically distribut-
ing twenty points to every applicant from the "underrepresented mi-
nority" applicant pool had the result of treating race as an absolute,
"which could jettison a member of an underrepresented group into the
accept[ed] category, regardless of the experiences or qualities that
race had contributed to the development of the individual."197
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court failed to specifically
rely on the four-pronged narrowly tailored test it had previously ar-
ticulated in Paradise. Instead, it relied on Justice Powell's language
in Bakke, which it decided prior to Paradise, as controlling on the is-
sue. 198 LSA's policy went beyond the spirit of Justice Powell's edict
that race can be considered a factor in admissions, since it failed to
allow for interpretation of "individual qualities or experience not de-
pendent upon race but sometimes associated with it."199 Therefore,
action certification did not grant standing because the class representatives still
needed to show that they had been personally injured. Id. at 289.
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed and held that the
plaintiffs did have standing. The majority held that it was not determinative for
the issue of standing whether Hamacher actually applied to transfer. Id. at
260-61. The majority pointed out that Stevens's questioning of the issue directly
conflicted with the finding of fact made by the district court, which held
Hamacher "intends to transfer to the University of Michigan when defendants
cease the use of race as an admission preference." Id. at 261. The majority also
held that it was well established that intent can be relevant to standing in the
context of Equal Protection challenges. Id. Since Hamacher was ready to trans-
fer if the LSA stopped using race, he had standing to seek injunctive relief with
respect to the LSA's use of race in undergraduate admissions. Id. at 261. The
majority also disagreed with Justice Stevens about the differences between the
admissions policies. Id. at 263. The petitioners were challenging the use of race
in undergraduate admissions and sought injunctive relief prohibiting the use of
race. The district court certified the class and found that Hamacher was a valid
class representative. Id. at 263-64. The differences in the policies were not that
great, and when the University challenged Hamacher's standing, they did not
raise the issue of the differences in the policies. The majority held that
Hamacher had standing to seek injunctive relief. Id. at 260.
195. Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas).
196. Id. at 275. "[Tlhe Court finds that the University's current policy, which auto-
matically distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee ad-
mission, to every single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of
race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity." Id. at 246.
197. Id.
198. "In Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion emphasized that when using race in admis-
sions each applicant had to be considered as an individual." Gratz, 539 U.S. at
244. In this case, the LSA automatically gave twenty points to all minority appli-
cants. Id. at 277. This automatic granting of points to all minority applicants
precluded the individualized review that Powell cited in Bakke. Id.
199. Id. at 272-73 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324
(1978)). Again relying on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the district court
determined that the admissions program the LSA began using in 1999 was a
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the program was not narrowly drawn in a constitutionally permissible
way.
The majority found LSA's policy flawed, since the individual re-
view was provided only after admissions counselors automatically as-
signed points to a candidate. 20 0 It rejected the University's concern
that the volume of applications made it impractical for LSA to use an
admissions system primarily based on individual review, and thus au-
tomatic assignment was the only means to efficiently consider the vol-
ume of applicants it received each year. 2 0 1 In response, the Court
wrote, "the fact that the implementation of a program capable of pro-
viding individualized consideration might present administrative
challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic
system."2
0 2
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor elaborated on the fatal flaw
of LSA's policy. 20 3 LSA's practice of assigning points to applicants
merely because they are members of a particular class precluded the
committee from considering the effect race had on each individual and
his or her ability to contribute to meaningful class discussion.
2 04
Under LSA's policy, "underrepresented minority" status had the effect
of almost guaranteeing acceptance to the school, rather than serving
as a contributing factor in the decisionmaking process.
20 5 Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that an applicant could acquire a significant
narrowly tailored means of achieving the University's interest in the educational
benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse student body. See Gratz
v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
jected LSA's argument that the policy's individual review system, which was trig-
gered after the points were assigned, satisfied the Court's requirement that a
narrowly tailored policy allow for individual review. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-76.
Under LSA's policy, admissions officials could flag applicants whom they believed
were worthy of personal consideration. Id. at 278. Once an application was flag-
ged, the reviewing committee could look at the application as a whole, and ignore
the points that had been assigned. Id.
200. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274. The Court held that the possibility of committee review
"is of little comfort under our strict scrutiny analysis." Id. There was not enough
information in the record to know how many applicants were actually "flagged,"
but the Court felt that it was undisputed that the individual consideration was
"the exception and not the rule." Id. It also did not satisfy strict scrutiny, be-
cause the individualized review of the committee only occurred after the LSA
distributed "the University's version of a 'plus' that makes race a decisive factor
for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant." Id.
at 247.
201. Id. at 275.
202. Id.
203. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 280. The LSA's automatic award of points did not satisfy the requirements
of providing the individualized consideration. Id. This is in contrast to the Law
School's program, which O'Connor held constitutional because each application
was read completely and considered individually, and therefore race was only
used as a "plus." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334-36 (2003).
205. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 246.
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number of points through the other factors in the applicant's SCUGA
score, 2 06 but noted that the points assigned for those other categories
were significantly lower than those assigned for race. 20 7 Conse-
quently, "[e]ven the most outstanding national high school leader
could never receive more than five points for his or her accomplish-
ments-a mere quarter of the points automatically assigned to an un-
derrepresented minority solely based on the fact of his or her race."208
For these reasons, "the current non-individualized mechanical sys-
tem," Justice O'Connor wrote, "is flawed and fails under the narrowly
tailored test."20 9
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, found LSA's policy
flawed because "it awards all underrepresented minorities the same
racial preference."210 The policy failed to permit admissions counsel-
ors the ability to identify and consider nonracial distinctions among
underrepresented minority applicants.211 Ultimately, Justice
Thomas would have gone further than his brethren and potentially
even overruled Bakke.212 According to Justice Thomas, "a State's use
of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categori-
cally prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause."213
Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, and would have likely up-
held LSA's policy.214 Noting the holdings in Bakke and Grutter, Jus-
tice Souter wrote,
the decision should not go beyond a recognition that diversity can serve as a
compelling state interest justifying race-conscious decisions in education...
[thus] awarding value to racial diversity means that race must be considered
in a way that increases the applicant's chances of acceptance. 2 1 5
206. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000).
207. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring).
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 291-93. Justice Ginsburg joined Part II of the dissent. Id. Justice Souter
agreed with Justice Stevens that the plaintiffs in the case did not have standing.
Id. However, unlike Justice Stevens, Justice Souter continued his dissent and
held that despite the fact that the plaintiffs did not have standing, if he looked at
the merits of the case, he would still dissent from the Court's opinion. Id. Justice
Souter held that if the LSA's admissions program had been challenged by a plain-
tiff with proper Article III standing, he would have affirmed the district court's
summary judgment for the LSA. Id. at 297. However, since he held that the
plaintiffs did not have standing, he would vacate the judgment for lack of proper
jurisdiction, and he dissented from the majority opinion. Id.
215. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 292-95. Justice Souter felt that "college admission is not left
entirely to inarticulate intuition," and therefore it is proper to assign "some
stated value to a relevant characteristic, whether it be reasoning ability, writing
style, running speed, or minority race. Id. Justice Powell's plus factors necessa-
rily are assigned some values. The college simply does by a numbered scale what
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Justice Souter chose not to address the issue of whether LSA's policy
was narrowly tailored, and criticized the rest of the Court for passing
on that issue. According to Justice Souter, the issue before the Court
was essentially moot, because the plaintiff who brought the suit was a
transfer student, and not subject to LSA's entering class admissions
policy. 21
6
Justice Ginsburg's dissent focused more on the need to correct past
inequality than it did on the need for diversity in the classroom.
21 7
She wrote, "[t]he stain of generations of racial oppression is still visi-
ble in our society."218 As a result, she argued, there is a compelling
need for such policies, and wide latitude should be given when inter-
preting whether the policies are narrowly tailored.21 9 Therefore, Jus-
tice Ginsburg found "no constitutional [infirmities]."220 The policy
does not "constrict admissions opportunities" 221 for those who are not
members of an underrepresented class, and every applicant admitted
under LSA's plan was qualified to attend the University of Michi-
gan.2 22 Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged, schools will con-
tinue to use measures to ensure a diverse entering class but, in her
opinion, the Gratz decision will force these schools to cloak their
means of encouraging diversity in seemingly neutral clothes. 2 2
3 For
these reasons, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the majority opinion is
not a sound one.
Although the Gratz Court's opinions did not specifically reference
it, the majority opinion, the concurrences, and the dissents resonated
with aspects of the Paradise test. The majority tacitly employed the
first prong of the Paradise test by finding that there might be alterna-
the law school accomplishes by its 'holistic review.'" Id. at 292 (quoting Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003)).
216. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297. "The further question whether the freshman admissions
plan is narrowly tailored to achieving student body diversity remains legally ir-
relevant to Hamacher and should await a Plaintiff who is actually hurt by it." Id.
at 292.
217. Id. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In footnotes 1-9 of her dissenting opinion,
Justice Ginsburg provided extensive studies and statistical evidence about the
effects of discrimination. Id. at 299 nn.1-9.
218. Id. at 304.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 303.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See id. Justice Ginsburg felt that if schools could not specifically look at race and
still have their admissions program be constitutional, they would look for alter-
nate ways to include race in admissions decisions. Id. For example, schools could
ask applicants to write about "cultural traditions" in their essays or ask if En-
glish is their second language. Id. Applicants could also attempt to take advan-
tage of their race by highlighting associations in minority group organizations or
Hispanic family surnames. Id. Teachers could also try to mention an applicant's
race in their letters of recommendations. Id.
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tive methods to achieve diversity at the school, and therefore, alterna-
tive means to achieve the stated goals might be available. 224 The
Court's concern with the program's mechanical method of assigning
numbers invokes the flexibility prong. Under the Paradise test, a pro-
gram fails the second prong if it cannot easily ebb and flow with the
changing demographics.225 Both Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice
Rehnquist criticized LSA's policy for its strict concrete assignment of
numbers, and its failure to reevaluate the numerical system through-
out the duration of the program.22 6 Justice Thomas also criticized
LSA's policy as being inflexible.227
Justice Ginsburg, in her Gratz dissent, made clear reference to the
first prong of the Paradise narrowly tailored test.228 Her concern that
present effects of past discrimination remain in the classroom sup-
ported her position that the necessity for relief and the efficacy of
other alternatives supported the clear mandate for LSA's admissions
program. 22 9 Thus, while the Court did not specifically rely on the Par-
adise test in its analysis, its principles seemed to serve as the founda-
tion for many of the Justices' conclusions.
The Court continued its evaluation of affirmative action admis-
sions policies on the same day it decided Gratz, when it considered
Grutter v. Bollinger. Again, the court subjected the policy to strict
scrutiny, and again it relied on the principles of the Paradise test,
without making clear reference to it. In Grutter v. Bollinger, a divided
Court upheld the Law School's admissions policy. 23 0 The Court first
reaffirmed past decisions, which found a compelling governmental in-
terest in admitting a diverse entering class.2 31 Furthermore, the
Court found that the Law School's policy was narrowly tailored to
meet that interest, since it allowed members of the admissions com-
mittee to individually review applicants in a way that considered race
and ethnicity among a host of diversity factors.232
The majority reaffirmed Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke, that
achieving diversity in education supports a finding of a compelling
governmental interest.233 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
observed that, in the Court's view, "[a]ttaining a diverse student body
224. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297.
225. See Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in Pub-
lic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARv. L. REV. 940, 956-57 (1999).
226. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 280.
227. Id. at 281.
228. Id. at 302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 303.
230. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, which was
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined in part. Id. at 310.
231. Id. at 308.
232. Id. at 334.
233. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
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is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission, and
• . . 'good faith' [on the part of a university] is 'presumed' absent 'a
showing to the contrary." 23 4 The Law School properly articulated a
compelling governmental interest by stating in its mission statement
the need to admit a "critical mass" in order to assemble a class that is
broadly diverse.2 35 The Court also found that the compelling govern-
mental interests in a diverse classroom transcended the classroom to
apply to society as a whole. 23 6 It found that the "skills needed in to-
day's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."237
Once the majority was satisfied that the Law School's promotion of
diversity sufficiently demonstrated a compelling state interest, it
turned its attention to whether the policy was narrowly tailored to
meet that interest. Again, the Court did not specifically rely on all
four prongs of the Paradise test. Rather, the majority acknowledged
the need for a modified version of the Paradise test, holding in Grutter
that the "inquiry must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by
the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public higher edu-
cation."2 38 Consequently, the Court found that in order to pass the
narrowly tailored test, the party defending an affirmative action ad-
missions program need only demonstrate that the program was flexi-
ble and nonmechanical, and limited in its duration.
23 9
The Grutter Court first considered the flexibility of the program.
Specifically, the Court looked at whether the Law School program em-
ployed a quota system or some other means that "'insulat[ed] each
category of applicants from all other applicants."'
24 0 The ideal policy,
according to the majority, would be "'flexible enough to consider all
pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications
of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for considera-
tion, although not necessarily according them the same weight."'
24 1
The Law School's policy made race or ethnicity a factor that could con-
234. Id. at 308 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313
(1978)). Justice O'Connor held that the benefits from diversity "are substantial,"
as shown by the District Court. Id. at 330. Achieving diversity helps promote
"cross-racial understanding," breaks down stereotypes, and lets students better
understand people from other races. Id. These benefits of diversity were also
asserted by the amici, including major American businesses, and high-ranking
retired officers and civilian officials from the United States Military. Id.
235. Id. at 328.
236. Id. at 330.
237. Id. The Court also adopted the Military's conclusion that "a 'highly qualified,
racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its
principle mission to provide national security.'" Id. (quoting Brief for Amici Cu-
riae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306).
238. Id. at 333-34.
239. Id. at 334, 342.
240. Id. at 334 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
241. Id. at 337 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
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tribute to making an applicant qualified for admission to the law
school, but neither race nor ethnicity was elevated to such significant
status that it would have the effect of ensuring automatic accept-
ance. 242 The Law School's decision to consider race or ethnicity as one
of several factors of import was one reason why the Court found that
the program was narrowly tailored.243
The Court next turned its attention to whether the Law School pol-
icy's mission of seeking a "critical mass" would mean that the policy
was too broad in scope to be narrowly tailored. 244 The Court's dissent-
ers argued that the goal of seeking a "critical mass" was really nothing
more than a disguised quota.2 45 The majority disagreed.246 Any pol-
icy that gives some sort of preferential treatment to a particular cate-
gory of persons would, indeed, be less than ideal, and one could always
speculate that there are more restrictive alternatives to achieving the
goal of a diverse classroom.247 The majority, however, felt sufficiently
comfortable that the Law School had adopted a workable and constitu-
tionally permissible program.248
Finally, recalling the language of many of its earlier strict scrutiny
cases, the Grutter Court considered whether the Law School policy
was narrowly drawn and sufficiently effective to achieve its goals. The
majority recognized that while one might be able to hypothesize alter-
natives to the Law School's policy, the policy before the Court met the
strict scrutiny test.2 49 However, Justice O'Connor wrote that nar-
242. Id. at 337-41. Justice O'Connor found significant similarities between the Law
School's policy and the Harvard Plan, to which Justice Powell referred in Bakke
as constitutionally permissible. Id. at 335-38. Both plans adequately ensure
that "all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully
considered alongside race in admissions decisions." Id. at 337. Neither the
Harvard Plan, nor the Law School's admissions policy, identified either race or
ethnicity as the single characteristic that would ensure diversity. Id. at 338.
243. Id. at 334, 337-41.
244. Id. at 335.
245. Id. at 378-83 (Rehnquist, C.J., with whom Scalia, Kennedy, & Thomas, J.J., join,
dissenting).
246. "The Law School's goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority
students does not transform its program into a quota." Id. at 335-36. "[T]here is
of course 'some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be
derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a rea-
sonable environment for those students admitted. [Slome attention to numbers'
without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid
quota." Id. at 336 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323).
247. Id. at 341.
248. Id. at 340.
249. See id. at 337-41. The Grutter Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the
school had considered race-neutral alternatives. Id. at 340. The district court
had proposed race-neutral alternatives like using a lottery system, decreasing the
school's reliance on grades and test scores, or automatically admitting a certain
percentage from each high school. Id. The Court rejected these alternatives; the
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rowly tailored "does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative," 250 and thus the policy passed the strict scrutiny
test.25
1
While the majority found that a policy that considers race or
ethnicity as one factor among several factors to be narrowly tailored, it
expressed its concern that schools continue to use such policies ad in-
finitum.2 52 "In the context of higher education, the durational re-
quirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious
admissions policies and periodic reviews . *..."253 Justice O'Connor
wrote that the Court "expect[s] that 25 years from now, the use of ra-
cial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest ap-
proved today."
2 54
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred with the Court's finding
that the Law School's policy did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, but they took issue with the "sunset provision" of Justice
O'Connor's decision.2 55 Each Justice expressed concern with the lan-
guage of the Court. Justice Ginsburg expressed concern that the pro-
vision was optimistic, but not realistic. 2 56 She wrote, "one may hope,
but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span, progress
toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make
it safe to sunset affirmative action."
257
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ken-
nedy each filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.2 58 Both Justice Thomas's and Justice Scalia's opinions in
Grutter suggest that they would never uphold an admissions policy
that granted racial preferences. 2 59 Justice Thomas concurred with
that part of the Court's holding that he interpreted to require "that
lottery system would not work because it precluded the individualized review
that is required. Id. Requiring the Law School to lower its standards would be to
drastically change the school and require it to "sacrifice a vital component of its
educational mission." Id. Automatically admitting a certain top percentage of
each high school class would also not work because this would also preclude indi-
vidualized review and the Court did not understand how it could be applied to
graduate level schools. Id.
250. Id. at 339.
251. See id. at 337-41.
252. Id. at 342-43.
253. Id. at 342.
254. Id. at 343.
255. See id. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
256. See id.
257. Id. at 346.
258. Id. at 346-95 (concurring and dissenting opinions).
259. Id. at 347, 349-51 (Scalia & Thomas, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). They concur in part with Rehnquist, who says, "I agree with the Court
that, 'in the limited circumstance when drawing racial distinctions is permissi-
ble,' the government must ensure that its means are narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling state interest." Id. at 378 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in
25 years."26 0 He disagreed, however, with the Court's decision to up-
hold the Law School's compelling interest in maintaining a diverse en-
tering class.2 6 1 Thomas looked at the Law School's policy from a
pragmatic standpoint. The Law School's need to use race as a plus in
admissions was derived from its desire to admit an elite entering
class. 26 2 As a general matter, nonminority students significantly out-
performed underrepresented minorities on objective tests, hence the
need for the "plus" in the admissions policy.263 If, however, the Law
School chose not to admit a majority of the student body with objective
test scores, it would not need to give underrepresented minorities a
"plus" in the admissions process.2 64 There was no compelling state
interest in having an elite Law School, Justice Thomas maintained,
and for this reason the policy should have been struck down.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, provided little guidance re-
garding what he thought the Law School could have done to assure
that the program was narrowly tailored. 26 5 His dissent paid careful
attention to the inflexibility of the program, particularly the relation-
ship between the number of underrepresented minority students who
applied to the Law School, and the number who were accepted. 26 6 Ac-
cording to the Chief Justice,
[T]he correlation between the percentage of the Law School's pool of appli-
cants who are members of the three minority groups and the percentage of the
admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise
to be dismissed as merely the result of the school paying "some attention to
[the] numbers."
2 6 7
260. Id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 369-70.
264. Id. at 378. Justice Kennedy also mentioned "objective test scores" in his dissent,
but either did not take notice of or does not believe in racial biases in standard-
ized test scores. See id. at 378 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy continued:
About 80 to 85 percent of the places in the entering class are given to
applicants in the upper range of Law School Admissions Test scores and
grades. An applicant with these credentials likely will be admitted with-
out consideration of race or ethnicity. With respect to the remaining 15
to 20 percent of the seats, race is likely outcome determinative for many
members of minority groups. That is, where the competition becomes
tight and where any given applicant's chance of admission is far smaller
if he or she lacks minority status. At this point the numerical concept of
critical mass has the real potential to compromise individual review.
Id. at 389.
265. See id. at 378-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
266. See id. at 381-85.
267. Id. at 383 (second alteration in original).
From 1995 through 2000, the Law School admitted between 1,130 and
1,310 students. Of those, between 13 and 19 were Native American, be-
tween 91 and 108 were African-Americans, and between 47 and 56 were
Hispanic. If the Law School [was] admitting between 91 and 108 Afri-
[Vol. 83:631
BACK TO BAKKE
The mathematical precision in which Justice Rehnquist believed the
Law School had engaged was problematic, as it was tantamount to a
quota.268 For this reason, Rehnquist would have struck down the Law
School program.
The Grutter majority reached its conclusion based on a somewhat
clearly articulated, narrowly tailored test, separate and apart from
the one adopted by the Paradise Court. Although the Court defini-
tively articulated its test, one can cull from the various opinions cer-
tain requirements that the Court will insist upon before declaring an
affirmative action admission policy constitutionally valid. Justice
O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist demanded proof that the pro-
gram was both flexible and necessary. 26 9 Justice O'Connor's dura-
tional requirement confirmed the additional need to find that any
such program is temporary in nature. Justice Ginsburg, in her dis-
sent, confirmed the need for a durational requirement, but disagreed
with the specific time limit upon which the majority relied in this
case.2 70 Read together with Gratz, the various Court opinions in
Grutter tie up nicely to create a blueprint for considering future con-
stitutional challenges to affirmative action admission policies.
IV. DEFINING THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ADMISSION PROGRAMS
The use of race in the admissions process mandates a strict scru-
tiny test "calibrated to fit [its own] distinct issues."27 ' The body of law
that articulates the appropriate test was largely developed in response
to Equal Protection Challenges in the workplace. 27 2 With the excep-
tion of Bakke, the Court did not consider Equal Protection challenges
can-Americans in order to achieve "critical mass," thereby preventing Af-
rican-American students from feeling "isolated or like spokespersons for
their race," one would think that a number of the same order of magni-
tude would be necessary to accomplish the same purpose for Hispanics
and Native Americans. Similarly, even if all of the Native American ap-
plicants admitted in a given year matriculate, which the record demon-
strates is not at all the case, how can this possibly constitute a "critical
mass" of Native Americans in a class of over 350 students? In order for
this pattern of admission to be consistent with the Law School's explana-
tion of 'critical mass," one would have to believe that the objectives of
"critical mass" offered by respondents are achieved with only half the
number of Hispanics and one-sixth the number of Native Americans as
compared to African-Americans.
Id. at 381.
268. See id. at 383-86.
269. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 342-43, 385-87.
270. Id. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 334.
272. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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to programs aimed at ensuring a diverse classroom until Grutter and
Gratz. In the workplace environment, the Court will find a compelling
governmental interest in a program that was created to remedy pre-
sent effects of past discrimination.2 73 The program is narrowly tai-
lored if it meets the four prongs of the Paradise test. But where
admitting students into educational institutions is concerned, the
body of case law, starting with Bakke and developed through Grutter
and Gratz poses a slightly different evaluation of both the compelling
governmental interest and the narrowly tailored prongs of the compel-
ling governmental interest test.
Read together, Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz, define a construct for
drafting a constitutionally permissible race-preference admission pol-
icy that would withstand strict scrutiny. Under these most recent
cases, the Court will find a compelling governmental interest if there
is proof of a need for diversity in the classroom; the program will pass
the narrowly tailored test if there is proof that (1) it is the least intru-
sive and most efficient means to achieve the goals of the program or
policy and (2) it is "flexible, [and] nonmechanical" 2 74 and, from the
Grutter Court, is limited in duration.2
75
A. The Classroom Diversity Strict Scrutiny Test: A New Test
for Evaluating Affirmative Action Admission Policies
1. The Compelling Governmental Interest Test
Both Grutter and Gratz stand for the proposition that Justice Pow-
ell's plurality decision finding diversity in education as a compelling
governmental interest, is the "law of the land."2 76 The decisions re-
jected the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' findings that, under Marks,
Justice Powell's definition of a compelling governmental interest was
not binding on the courts.2 77 In each case, eight of the nine Justices
found that diversity can serve as a compelling state interest justifying
273. See supra subsection II.A.2.
274. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 315-17 (1978)).
275. Id. at 342-43. "Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would
offend this fundamental equal protection principle. We see no reason to exempt
race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement that all governmental
use of race must have a logical end point." Id. "We have emphasized that we will
consider 'the planned duration of the remedy' in determining whether a race-
conscious program is constitutional." Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 510 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 171 (1987) ("In determining whether race-conscious remedies are ap-
propriate, we look to several factors, including the ... duration of the relief...
276. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
277. See supra notes 89 and 133. Note that both the Hopwood and Johnson courts
limited their opinions to the precedential weight of Justice Powell's opinion.
Neither discussed the justification of whether diversity supports a compelling
governmental interest.
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race-conscious decisions in education.278 Justice Thomas was argua-
bly the only exception among the brethren on this point.
27 9
Even Justice Thomas's dissents in both Grutter and Gratz, each of
which cogently articulated the assertion that any affirmative action
admission policy must fail under the Equal Protection Clause, leave
room to interpret an instance where there could be a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in admitting a diverse class.280 Justice Thomas
suggested in Grutter that there is some merit in achieving a diverse
student body, writing that classroom aesthetics yield educational ben-
efits.2 s1 It was the manner in which each school achieved the bene-
fits, more than the benefits themselves, with which he took issue.28 2
The need for a different definition of a compelling governmental
interest in programs or policies that promote diversity in the class-
room, versus those that promote diversity in the workplace, is predi-
cated on the notion that all individuals benefit from a diverse learning
environment, 28 3 whereas under a capitalist system, promotion or ad-
vancement in the workplace is to the benefit of the one being promoted
and to the exclusion of those left behind. There is clearly a strong
societal value to promoting underrepresented minorities in the work-
place. Advancing members of a particular race or ethnicity can create
positive role models for future generations and pave the way to more
success in those groups, ultimately rendering the need for affirmative
action policies unnecessary. However, the framers of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause did not draft it to serve as a guarantor that society cre-
278. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
279. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring).
280. Although in Gratz, Justice Thomas provides a somewhat cursory concurrence to
the Court's extensive opinion, in Grutter, he dedicates significant time to defining
a compelling governmental interest in the context of education. In Grutter, he
acknowledges that there is a compelling governmental interest to remedy present
effects of past discrimination. See 539 U.S. at 351-52 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). If he were to agree with Justice Ginsburg's concur-
rence, maintaining that discrimination based on race remains alive in our land,
then he would have to support a finding of a compelling governmental interest to
permit race-conscious admissions policies.
281. Id. at 355.
282. Justice Thomas found that, had the school relaxed its credentials, it could have
achieved its goals. But, in the interest of creating an elite institution, the school
needed to adopt the preferential treatment. Id. at 355. This argument rests on
the premise that minority applicants perform less well on the LSAT. See Leslie
Yalof Garfield, The Academic Support Student in the Year 2010, 69 U. Mo. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 491 (2001). If a school is to base its admissions on LSAT scores and
wants only those applicants who achieved the highest scores on the standardized
test, then, because of the disproportionate performance of nonminorities, the ap-
plicant pool is highly skewed and not as many minority applicants fall in that
range. If Michigan relaxed its median LSAT score, then more minority appli-
cants would fall within the school's target applicant pool.
283. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978).
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ate role models or promote the social good by developing a truly
heterogeneous workplace.28 4 "The central purpose of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause .... is the prevention of official conduct discriminating
on the basis of race,"28 5 and thus, it cannot be used as a means to
merely promote a more heterogeneous society for society's sake. Con-
sequently, because there is no demonstrable benefit to those who may
lose a job that is given to a member of an underrepresented minority
class, the compelling governmental interest test, when evaluated for
purposes of ensuring fairness in the workplace, is limited to instances
where the defending party can demonstrate proof of present effects of
past discrimination.
In education, however, as Justice Powell nicely articulated, the
benefits of education flow both ways.28 6 Legal education is a prime
example of Justice Powell's edict. The goal of teaching future lawyers
is to empower them with the ability to review a particular set of facts
from many angles.28 7 When students of color bring their varied exper-
iences to the classroom, it allows others to hear and consider perspec-
tives they might not have considered on their own. To be sure, there is
a societal value in having different cultures work side-by-side too. Di-
versity promotes tolerance, harmony, and greater understanding of
those around us. But the Equal Protection Clause is not designed to
284. A prime example of this might be President Johnson's appointment of Justice
Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court in 1967. His past experiences and
viewpoints shaped many important cases and, more importantly, his visibility
and his sage wisdom made him a valuable role model to younger African-Ameri-
cans. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. at 283-84 (1986).
285. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). See also Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) ("[Tlhe primary purpose of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause was to end discrimination against the former slaves."); Assoc. Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th
Cir. 1987) (striking down racial preference under strict scrutiny while upholding
gender preference under intermediate scrutiny).
286. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313. Many members of the Court have recognized the
compelling governmental interest in achieving diversity in the classroom..
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court considered the validity of F.C.C. poli-
cies granting preferential treatment based on race. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, wrote "a 'diverse student body' contributing to a
'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally permissible goal.'" In Wy-
gant, where the Court reversed a decision upholding a bargaining agree-
ment that limited the number of minority teachers the Board of
Education would lay off in order to preserve the ratio of minority to
nonminority faculty, four Justices recognized the compelling governmen-
tal interest in diversifying education. Justice O'Connor in her concur-
rence wrote that the "state interest in the promotion of racial diversity
[in education] has been found sufficiently compelling." Justices Mar-
shall, Brennan, and Blackmun in their dissent agreed with Justice
O'Connor that the state has a compelling governmental interest in diver-
sifying education.
Garfield, supra note 10, at 913-14 (citations omitted).
287. Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) ("[Llegal learning [is in]effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.).
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promote tolerance-it is designed to promote fairness. A lawyer's cli-
ent will get the best and most fair representation from someone who
has had the benefit of a premier education. That education, the Jus-
tices seem to argue, is derived from a student who is taught in a class-
room where ideas and experiences are varied and shared.28 8 For this
reason, the need to promote diversity in the classroom is a proper jus-
tification of a compelling governmental interest.
2. The Narrowly Tailored Test
The Grutter and Gratz decisions evidence that the Court has
adopted an alternative to the Paradise narrowly tailored test for appli-
cation to race-based programs aimed at promoting diversity in the
classroom. 28 9 Like their predecessors, the Justices in Grutter and
Gratz put no burden on the defendants to prove that their programs
were the most narrowly tailored since "narrowlyl tailoring does not
require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative."
29 0
An educational admissions program is narrowly tailored if (1) it is the
least intrusive and most effective means to achieve the goals of the
program and (2) it is "flexible, [and] nonmechanical"2 9 1 and limited in
duration.2
9 2
The need for a different narrowly tailored test between race-con-
scious programs aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom and
those programs aimed at achieving diversity in the workplace, is com-
pelling in light of the varying goals of each. Judge Marcus, in John-
son, acknowledged that the "Paradise factors should be adjusted
slightly to take better account of the unique issues raised by the use of
race to achieve diversity in university admissions." 29 3 Judge Marcus
proposed a four-pronged test that slightly modified the Paradise
test.2 94 Neither the Grutter nor the Gratz Court specifically recalled
288. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003).
289. "[The strict scrutiny] inquiry must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by
the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public higher education."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. "[W]e adhere to Adarand's teaching that the very pur-
pose of strict scrutiny is to take such 'relevant differences into account.'" Id. at
334 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228). But see id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting that the majority "abandoned" the strict scrutiny test).
290. Id. at 344. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (holding
that "a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but
that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.");
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287 (1986) ("plan need not be lim-
ited to the remedying of specific instances of identified discrimination for it to be
deemed sufficiently 'narrowly tailored'").
291. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-16).
292. Id. at 342.
293. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1252 (11th Cir. 2001).
294. Id. at 1253.
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Judge Marcus' remarks; however, the two opinions reached a similar
conclusion, recognizing, through the manner in which the Court ana-
lyzed each case, the need for a new test. While Judge Marcus called
for a test that mirrors the Paradise test, an interpretation of the Grut-
ter and Gratz decisions read together with Bakke, yields a new nar-
rowly tailored test, distinct in some ways from the Court's narrowly
tailored test for affirmative action programs aimed at eliminating dis-
crimination in the workplace.
a. The Program Is the Least Intrusive and Most Effective
Means To Achieve the Goals of the Program
Each decision evidenced that the Court will require proof that the
proposed program was the least intrusive and most efficient means of
accomplishing the program's goal.29 5 The Grutter majority acknowl-
edged that "'the means chosen [must] fit th[e] compelling goal so
closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the clas-
sification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.'" 29 6 In
Gratz, respondents argued that drawing the least intrusive program
would be unduly burdensome given the multitude of applications re-
ceived each year.29 7 The Court's swift rejection of their argument in-
dicates further support for the assertion that it will require the most
precise, least intrusive means of achieving diversity in the classroom,
regardless of any demonstrable needs to the contrary.
[A] court evaluating a school admissions program designed to serve a
compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits associated with
a diverse student body should examine: (1) whether the policy uses race
in a rigid or mechanical way that does not take sufficient account of the
different contributions to diversity that individual candidates may offer;
(2) whether the policy fully and fairly takes account of race-neutral fac-
tors which may contribute to a diverse student body; (3) whether the
policy gives an arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to members of the
favored racial groups; and (4) whether the school has genuinely consid-
ered, and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for creating
student body diversity. The foregoing factors essentially correspond to
all of the factors adopted in Paradise (other than duration) for affirma-
tive action plans generally.
Id.
295. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908
(1996) ("[The] government is still 'constrained in how it may pursue that end:
[T]he means chosen to accomplish the [government's] asserted purpose must be
specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.'") (internal cita-
tions omitted)).
296. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plural-
ity opinion)).
297. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
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b. The Program Is "Flexible and Nonmechanical" and
Limited in Duration
According to Justice O'Connor in Grutter,
When using race as a "plus" factor in university admissions, a university's
admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each appli-
cant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's
race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.
2 9 8
A program passes the flexible prong of the narrowly tailored test,
therefore, if it "consider[s] all pertinent elements of diversity in light
of the particular qualifications of [an] applicant and ... place[s] them
on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily accord-
ing them the same weight."29 9 This flexible approach enables a school
to "take into account, in practice as well as in theory, a wide variety of
characteristics besides race and ethnicity that contribute to a diverse
student body."300
In essence, a flexible program is one that provides for "individual-
ized non-mechanical review." 3 01 When considering whether a pro-
gram passes the flexible prong of the narrowly tailored test, the Court
is likely to consider the ability of admission committee members to
evaluate individuals against all other applicants in a given year, and
the thought or credit granted for nonobjective criteria that may con-
tribute to a diverse learning experience, not because of membership in
a particular class, but rather because of personal experience. The
Court cautions that programs that are mechanical in nature, as-
signing numbers or scores to certain attributes, must necessarily fail
the flexibility prong of the narrowly tailored test, as they have the
potential to result in quotas, which are strictly prohibited.302
Justice Souter, in his dissent in Gratz, defined a quota as a some-
thing that "'insulate[s]' all nonminority candidates from competition
from certain seats."3 03 The Court has labeled as quotas a program
that sets aside a certain number of admission spots for students based
on membership in particular groups 30 4 and a program that assigns
points to applicants based exclusively on membership in those
groups. 30 5 In each of these programs, the school's policy had the effect
298. 539 U.S. at 336.
299. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978).
300. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
301. Id. at 334.
302. Id. Opponents of the Law School's program argued that the goal of achieving a
critical mass was tantamount to setting a quota. The majority of the Court, how-
ever, clearly disagreed, finding that "'some attention to numbers,' without more,
does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota." Id. at 336
(quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323).
303. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 293 (2003) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
304. Bakke, 438 U.S. 289.
305. See supra notes 149-51, 192-211 and accompanying text.
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of giving applicants who are members of a particular racial or ethnic
group, a mathematical advantage over other applicants, which often
resulted in automatic admission, precluding the need for cummittee
review. Consequently, the use of quotas such as the ones challenged
in Bakke and Gratz prohibit admissions committees from meaningful
consideration of factors other than race, which could contribute to di-
versity in the classroom. The Court termed any program that resulted
in a lack of meaningful comparison between individual applicants as
inflexible and mechanical, and therefore constitutionally prohibited
under the Equal Protection Clause.3 06
Despite its recognition that admissions policies must necessarily
pay "some attention to numbers" 3 0 7 the Court has struck down the use
of numerical goals, calling such an instrument a quota.308 In Bakke,
Justice Powell wrote that "there is some relationship between num-
bers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student
body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment
for those students to be admitted."30 9 But in each of the affirmative
action admission cases, the Courts were swift to reject the need for
setting particular numbers to achieve diversity. In Bakke, a majority
of the Court held that goals and quotas are never permissible in enact-
ing race-conscious programs,3 10 and ultimately struck down the Uni-
versity of California at Davis Medical School admissions program as
violating of the Equal Protection Clause because it set aside a specific
number of seats for minority applicants.311 The majority in Gratz
raised concerns, because LSA's policy of automatically assigning
points to applicants who are members of a particular racial or ethnic
groups had the effect of giving those applicants a mathematical ad-
vantage over other applicants, thereby, arguably, creating easier ac-
cess to acceptance into the University. 3 12
In addition to proving that the program is flexible, under the sec-
ond prong of the Paradise test, the defending party must establish
that the challenged program is limited in duration. The Grutter Court
placed an affirmative duty on courts to limit constitutionally permissi-
ble race-conscious programs to those with a limited duration.3 13 Jus-
tice O'Connor wrote in Grutter that "[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth
306. See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
307. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323).
308. See supra notes 18-40, 149-51, 192-211 and accompanying text.
309. 438 U.S. at 323.
310. See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 149-51, 192-211 and accompanying text. But see Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 244, 293 (2003) ('The record does not describe a system with a quota
like the one struck down in Bakke, which 'insulate[d]' all nonminority candidates
from competition from certain seats.") (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317) (altera-
tion in original).
313. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-43 (2003).
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Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrim-
ination based on race."314 "Accordingly, race-conscious admissions
policies must be limited in time."3 15 In the context of achieving diver-
sity in the classroom, "the durational requirement can be met by sun-
set provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic
reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity."
3 16
The Gratz Court never fully considered the issue of whether LSA's
policy failed the durational requirement of the narrowly tailored test.
The Grutter Court, however, supported the Law School's program
under the durational requirement, in part because the Law School in
its Brief to the Court conceded, all "'race-conscious programs must
have reasonable durational limits."'317 As a result, the Court took
"the Law School at its word that it would ... terminate its race-con-
scious admissions program as soon as practicable."
3 18 The Law
School's identifiable goal of rendering its own program unnecessary in
the future was sufficient for the Court to find that it met the limited-
in-duration requirement.
3 19
B. The Appropriateness of the Classroom Diversity Strict
Scrutiny Test
At the outset, the new strict scrutiny test is really just a reaffirma-
tion and further interpretation of Bakke, particularly when defining a
compelling governmental interest. The Court's ruling serves to quash
the split in the Circuits created by the Smith, Johnson, and Hopwood
314. Id. at 341.
315. Id. at 342. Justice O'Connor wrote:
This requirement reflects that racial classifications, however compelling
their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no
more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justi-
fication for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal pro-
tection principle. We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions
programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must
have a logical end point. The Law School, too, concedes that all race-
conscious programs must have reasonable durational limits.
Id.
316. Id. In Grutter, the majority arguably called for the abolishment of affirmative
action admission policies within the next twenty-five years. Justice Ginsburg, in
her concurrence took exception to the majority's mandate, writing that Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Gratz supports the notion that the language must be
read as discretionary. She wrote that "[firom today's vantage point, one may
hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span, progress to-
ward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to
sunset affirmative action." Id. at 346. See also id. at 375 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("While I agree that in 25 years the practice of the Law School will be illegal, they
are, for the reasons I have given, illegal now."). Id. at 375.
317. Id. at 342. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 32, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306).
318. Id. at 343.
319. Id. at 342-43.
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courts. Grutter and Gratz formalize an identifiable compelling govern-
mental interest in achieving diversity in education. Post-Grutter and
-Gratz, courts charged with evaluating the constitutionality of race-
based programs must find a compelling governmental interest in
those programs if they are designed to remedy present effects of past
discrimination in the workplace,320 or to achieve diversity in the
classroom.321
The narrowly tailored prong of the classroom diversity strict scru-
tiny test for affirmative action admissions programs is rightfully dis-
tinguishable from the Paradise test. The classroom diversity test
retains only the first and second prongs of the Paradise test. The
courts must consider (1) the necessity of the relief and the efficacy of
alternative remedies, and (2) the flexibility of the program and the
duration of the relief.322 The other two prongs of the Paradise nar-
rowly tailored test do not, as Justice Marcus suggests in Johnson, al-
low for a fair evaluation of the unique set of circumstances presented
when reviewing race-conscious programs aimed at achieving diversity
in the classroom.323
The first prong of the Paradise test, wherein the necessity for the
relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies are considered, really
relates to the demonstrable need for achieving the stated goals of the
program and proof that the proposed program will meet those goals,
regardless of whether the program is aimed at eradicating discrimina-
tion in the workplace or those aimed at achieving diversity in educa-
tion. Both types of programs are designed to reach the same end,
which is to meet the stated goals of the Fourteenth Amendment that
governmental programs impact on individual citizens equally. The
commonalities of these two types of programs support the need to re-
tain the first prong of the Paradise test.
The second prong of the Paradise test, which requires the program
to be flexible, waivable, and temporary in nature, is also relevant to
programs designed to achieve diversity in the classroom.324 Under
this prong, the Court has stated, an affirmative action program must
be easily adaptable to changing governmental needs (flexible); easily
terminated when not needed (waivable); and limited in duration (tem-
porary).3 25 As a general matter, the Court has found that a program
is "flexible" when it includes the ability to consider race, ethnicity, or
320. See supra subsection II.A.2.
321. See supra section II.B and Part III.
322. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
323. Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2001).
324. See, e.g., Tuttle by Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir.
1999); Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
325. See U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 178 (1987); Garfield, supra note 10, at 916.
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gender as one of several criteria. For example, in Johnson v. Trans-
portation Agency,3 2 6 the Court considered a challenge to a county af-
firmative action program that allowed the County to consider an
applicant's gender or race for purpose the of remedying the under-
representation of women and minorities in traditionally segregated
job categories. The plan, the Court held, "represents a moderate, flexi-
ble, case-by-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the
representation of minorities and women in the Agency's work
force."3 27 Courts have found that those programs that are easily ter-
minated or provide for periodic review meet the durational require-
ment, while those programs that do not include a provision for
termination are invalid. 3 28 In Croson, the Court struck down the Mi-
nority Business Enterprise legislation, since it did not have either a
specific termination date or, at a minimum, a provision for reviewing
the legislation.3 2 9 The Paradise court, in contrast, found the one-
black-to-one-white hiring plan sufficiently limited in duration, since
the district court mandated the hiring program only for as long as the
department continued to prohibit minorities from being promoted.
3 30
Additionally, under the consent decree, the court could easily elimi-
nate the program once Alabama's Department of Public Safety pro-
moted a reasonable number of black and Hispanic troopers by no
longer mandating the State's method of promotion.
3 3 1 Finally in
Grutter, the Court held that the Law School Program was sufficiently
temporary in nature, the Program provided for periodic faculty re-
view, and it was easy to terminate once the School found that it no
longer needed to consider race as a factor to achieve diversity.
3 32
The need for an assessment of the flexibility and duration of a pro-
gram transcends the fundamental goals that a race-conscious program
seeks to achieve. Regardless of whether the programs exist to eradi-
cate present effects of past discrimination in the workplace, or achieve
diversity in the classroom, because these programs give some type of
preference to members of a particular class, they are designed in a
manner that potentially infringes on another's rights under the Equal
Protection Clause. The higher purpose of these programs and policies
is to achieve a status quo that no longer requires any infringement.
For this reason, it is necessary that the Court always consider the
ability to limit and change both workplace-oriented and education-ori-
ented race-conscious programs as they become less necessary.
326. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
327. Id. at 642.
328. See e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
329. 488 U.S. 469.
330. 480 U.S. at 178.
331. Id.
332. 539 U.S. at 342-43.
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The third and fourth prongs of the Paradise test are less necessary
for evaluating the permissibility of affirmative action admission poli-
cies under the equal protection clause. The third prong of the test-
the relationship of numerical goals to the relevant population-ap-
plies where the entity offering the program has set a numerical goal
for achieving diversity.333 For example, in Croson, the Court consid-
ered legislation that required primary contractors awarded city con-
struction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar
amount of each contract to Minority Business Enterprises.334 The
Richmond Legislature chose the numerical goal of thirty percent
based on the percentage of minorities in the general population. 3 35
The Court found that since the City's goal of thirty percent minority
subcontractors reflected the general population and not the relevant
population of minority contractors in the area, it did not meet the
third element of the narrowly tailored test.33 6 The Paradise Court
held that the one-black-to-one-white hiring scheme was valid because
the goal of the program was measured against the nonwhite popula-
tion in the relevant work force.3 3 7
In education, the use of numerical goals is impermissible, since set-
ting goals for the number of seats a school might want to fill with mi-
nority candidates is tantamount to setting a quota. Both the Grutter
and Gratz courts make clear that the only purpose for evaluating
numbers is to ensure that the programs do not result in a de facto
quota system.338 To be sure, as Justice O'Connor recognized in Grut-
ter, any program aimed at increasing diversity is necessarily going to
require a numbers assessment.3 39 Such numbers assessments, how-
ever, must be for the sole purpose of ensuring that the program does
not include numerical goals. As the majority in Bakke found, goals
and quotas are never permissible in enacting race-conscious
programs.340
The fourth prong-that the policy may not favor one group over
another-is, arguably, an inappropriate consideration for affirmative
action admission policies, mostly because Bakke established, and
Grutter and Gratz reaffirmed, that the benefits of diversity in educa-
tion favor all parties in an equal manner.3 4 1 To be sure, the Court has
333. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171, 179-82.
334. 488 U.S. at 507-10.
335. See id. at 485, 499, 507-10.
336. Id. at 499, 507-10.
337. 480 U.S. at 179-82.
338. See supra Part III. Justice Thomas, in his dissent in Grutter, wrote that the "con-
cept of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to
make race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals
indistinguishable from quotas." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 589 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
339. 539 U.S. at 335-36.
340. See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
341. See supra subsection II.A.1 and Part III and accompanying notes.
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upheld programs aimed at ending past discrimination in the work-
place where the program creates a slight burden on one party in com-
parison to another. For example, the Paradise court held that the one-
black-to-one-white hiring requirement did not pose an unacceptable
burden on white males because the program did not absolutely bar
any nonminority individual's advancement; it merely postponed the
white males' advancement. 3 42 However, in Paradise, the Court also
found that the advancement of black candidates was to the detriment
of Caucasian police academy applicants. 34
3 In contrast, the Court has
concluded that there is an equal benefit to any participant in the
classroom, regardless of race or ethnicity. Under this reasoning, then,
all individuals are "favored" by constitutionally permissible affirma-
tive action admission policies. Therefore, consideration of whether a
program favors one group over another is unnecessary when evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of programs and policies aimed at achieving
diversity in the classroom. Thus, the fourth prong of the Paradise test
is not applicable.
V. CONCLUSION
The "relevant differences"344 between achieving diversity in the
workplace and achieving diversity in the classroom demand different
strict scrutiny tests. The Court's decision to hear the Grutter and
Gratz cases following a twenty-five-year silence on the issue of the
constitutionality of affirmative action admission policies provided the
necessary forum for articulating a new test. The classroom diversity
strict scrutiny test retains the broad requirements of its predecessor
test, which was largely based on evaluating affirmative action pro-
grams and policies aimed at achieving equality in the workplace. Any
race-conscious program or policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling governmental interest in order to withstand a Constitu-
tional challenge. The classroom diversity test varies most signifi-
cantly from the former test in the manner in which it defines the
elements of the narrowly tailored prong. An interpretation of the
Grutter and Gratz rulings reveals that the four-pronged Paradise nar-
rowly tailored test is too expansive for evaluating race-conscious ad-
missions policies. Where education is concerned, a defending party
need only demonstrate that the program is (1) the least intrusive and
342. 480 U.S. at 182-83. The Paradise Court noted that, under the program, fifty
percent of those promoted were nonminority, there were no layoffs, and the basic
requirement that black troopers must be qualified still remained. Id. The Court
concluded that these provisions safeguarded the program against providing une-
qual treatment for individuals. Id. at 183.
343. Id. at 182-83.
344. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S
200, 228 (1995)).
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most effective means to achieve the goals of the program and (2) flexi-
ble and limited in duration. 345
The Court, in passing judgment on the University of Michigan's
different admission policies, provided insight into what satisfies each
prong of the classroom diversity strict scrutiny test.34 6 The Court af-
firmed Justice Powell's pronouncement in Bakke that diversity in the
classroom serves a compelling governmental interest.34 7 Moreover,
the Grutter and Gratz Courts found that admissions policies allowing
for individual review meet the flexible prong of the narrowly tailored
test.3 48 They further held that policies assigning points to member-
ship in a particular class are not flexible.349 Finally, a program that is
easily terminated is sufficiently limited in duration. 350
The new strict scrutiny test is appropriate, since it more accurately
reflects the goals, benefits, and limitations of an affirmative action
program aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom than did the
old test, which was developed in response to challenges in the work-
place. At the outset, the test recognizes the wide-reaching educational
benefit that these policies have to both members of a particular under-
represented class and to members of the majority. The new test also
dispenses with the requirement that the program or policy evaluate
numerical goals, recognizing that the use of numerical goals is never
appropriate in educational admissions decisions.
The need for a new strict scrutiny test for race-conscious programs
aimed at achieving diversity in the classroom provides a much-desired
window of opportunity for proponents of affirmative action admissions
policies. The Court's de facto articulation of this new test, and its find-
ings under the test, provide solid guidelines for schools to develop
workable programs in the future. More importantly, the Court's adop-
tion of the new strict scrutiny test-and its decision to uphold an af-
firmative action admission policy under the test-confirm its
commitment to continued use of race-conscious programs aimed at
achieving diversity in the classroom.
345. Id. at 334, 339, 342-43.
346. See supra section IV.B and accompanying notes.
347. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-33, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003).
348. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-275.
349. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-275.
350. See U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 149, 178 (1987); Garfield, supra note 10, at 916.
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